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IMPLEMENTING TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION: COMPARATIVE LESSONS
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Tara J. Melish*
INTRODUCTION

On September 28, 1950, Luke, a gentle and slender seventeen-year old
boy was taken into custody by paramilitary forces associated with the South
Korean state, accused of being a North Korean spy. He was never seen
again. His family learned of Luke's fate only months later as they prepared
to flee Seoul as refugees. Young Luke, they were told, had been taken to a
hill in Miari where he was shot and clandestinely buried in a mass grave
with others similarly accused. They should not expect his return. The family
never understood more fully what happened, why, or who was responsible.1
"For me, it defined my life," says his now 82-year old sister, who had gone
to the local village office to try to secure her younger brother's release,
explaining futilely but courageously to his captors why Luke could not possibly be a spy. 2 Haunted by his memory for over sixty years, she was for
decades unable to speak about her brother's disappearance. "I don't know
what happened," she says. "But there is a feeling if I walk, just walk, walk

* Associate Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY Buffalo
Law School, The State University of New York. The author extends her gratitude to
Tae-Ung Baik, John Ciorciari, Theresa Chun, Roger Des Forges, Kim Dong-Choon,
Hun Joon Kim, Lisa Laplante, Errol Meidinger, Makau Mutua, Ereshnee Naidu, Mark
Nathan, Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Kristin Stapleton, and David Westbrook for their outstanding contributions to the conference "Implementing Truth and Reconciliation:
Comparative Lessons for Korea," held on October 24, 2011 at the Baldy Center for Law
and Social Policy. The author is particularly indebted to Errol Meidinger and Mark
Nathan for their work co-organizing the conference and co-editing this Special Issue,
and to Dr. Theresa Chun for inspiring it.
1. Following a three month occupation by North Korea of Seoul and its surrounding villages in 1950, South Korean authorities and associated paramilitary groups interrogated, tortured, disappeared and extrajudicially executed thousands for their supposed
"collaborative" activities. See TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, REPUBLIC OF
KOREA, COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, Vol. 1, at 180-81 (2010) [hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE REPORT] (discussing mass killings of civilians before and during the Korean War).

2. Dr. Theresa Chun, A Survivor's Testimony: ClosingRemarks to the Conference
on "Implementing Truth and Reconciliation: Comparative Lessons for Korea," 19
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 73 (2012).
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I know I am not
to the end of the earth I will find Luke. That feeling .
3
alone. There are a lot of Korean people in my shoes."
To help uncover the untold truths and tragedies of victims like Luke
and to investigate the broad array of human rights violations suffered by the
Korean people over the last century, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea (hereinafter "TRCK" or "Commission") was established in December 2005. With one of the broadest and most wide-ranging
mandates of any truth commission in history, it was given four and a half
years to complete its investigatory work, submit a final report, and provide
a set of recommendations to the President and National Assembly. 4 On December 31, 2010 the TRCK officially closed its doors, having investigated
over eleven thousand reported cases of human rights violations taking place
between 1910 and 1993, and making recommendations to the government
on over eight thousand of them. These cases represent only a tiny fraction
of the state-sponsored abuses committed over the investigated period. 5 Nevertheless, their investigation represents an important turning point for a society in which discussion of past abuses by state authorities has long been
censured and a highly selective past remembered.
With its final report complete, it is now time to focus on effective and
timely implementation of the TRCK's official policy recommendations.
Such implementation is indispensable for helping to ensure deep and enduring preventative reform throughout society. Indeed, while truth commissions are created with a variety of objectives, key amongst them is the
identification of specific measures and policy interventions for government
and other stakeholders to take to ensure against the recurrence of violence
and rights abuses. Accordingly, truth commissions invariably conclude by
offering a variety of formal recommendations to national (and sometimes
3. Id. As Dr. Chun wrote in testimony to the TRCK, "All these times, our family
was unable to mention Luke's name for fear of opening the unbearable anguish. Therefore, we could not talk, console each other, and cry together .... I know Luke is not the
only innocent victim by South Koreans. For years people talked about atrocities committed by Communists and North Korean Soldiers. They never mentioned the atrocities
by South Koreans against fellow South Koreans. People were so afraid of being suspected of [being] Communist sympathizers or communists." Written testimony of Dr.
Theresa Chun to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea, Jan. 21,
2009 (on file with author).
4. See Framework Act on Clearing up Past Incidents for Truth and Reconciliation,
Law No. 7542, May 31, 2005 [hereinafter Framework Act], reprinted in TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION: AcTIVITIES OF THE PAST THREE YEARS 115 (2009) [hereinafter THREE YEAR REPORT].
5. See, e.g., COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 135 (acknowledging estimate that there are a million victims of civilian mass killings before and during the
Korean War, as well as limits of TRCK's ability to address valid claims).
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international) stakeholders. These generally include major political and institutional reforms in the policies and practices of the military, judiciary,
police, and intelligence services, as well as with respect to the media, education system, business sector, religious groups, and political parties. They
also include measures aimed at acknowledgment, memorialization, reconciliation, honoring, recognition, reparation, peace education, and access to
information, including access to the historical materials on which truth
commission findings are based. Such measures aim to ensure that the institutional policies, practices and relationships that allowed abuses of the past
to take place are effectively acknowledged, engaged and transformed.
And, yet, while the prevention of repetition is an overarching goal of
virtually all truth commission processes, surprisingly little scholarly or policy attention is devoted to assessing whether truth commission recommendations targeted at prevention are in fact effectively implemented in
practice. "No one has yet analyzed how many of the thousands of recommendations by truth commissions have been implemented." '6 This is true
even as it is widely recognized that "[s]uccessful implementation of truth
commission recommendations continues ... to be weak."'7 Indeed, scholars
lament the "enormous chasm" between the highly detailed recommendations truth commissions are mandated to develop and the "virtual dismissal,
or at least nonimplementation, of these recommendations by governments
that receive them." 8 Without targeted and sustained stakeholder attention,
"many commissions have seen a fine list of recommended reforms receive
very little governmental attention." 9 "There should be ways to improve this
10
record in the future."
This Special Issue is devoted to identifying such measures, with a particular view to improving the implementation of the recently-released
TRCK recommendations in South Korea. Those recommendations, published in English for the first time in this Special Issue," suggest a variety
of measures for the government of the Republic of Korea to take to restore

6.

PRISCILLA

B.

HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE

CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS

193 (2d ed. 2011).

7. Id. at 23.
8. Neil Kritz, Policy Implications of Empirical Research on TransitionalJustice,
in ASSESSING
SEARCH

THE IMPACT OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: CHALLENGES FOR EMPIRICAL RE-

13, 17 (Hugo Van der Merwe et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter

ASSESSING

TJ

IMPACT].

9. HAYNER, supra note 6, at 193.
10. Id.
11. FinalRecommendations of the Truth andReconciliation Commission, Repub-

lic of Korea, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 77 (2012) (Mark Nathan & Eon Joo Park,
trans.) [hereinafter TRCK Final Recommendations]. Found in Volume 1, Part II of the
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the honor of victims, compensate injuries suffered, promote societal reconciliation, and reform government policies and institutions.1 2 The extent to
which these and other TRCK-recommended measures are implemented, it
is contended, will to a large degree determine the long-term impact of the
TRCK on political transition and social transformation in South Korea.
Careful attention should thus be paid to the processes and dynamics that
13
guide, constrain, and promote implementation efforts.
The articles and essays in this Special Issue are devoted to exploring
these issues. They aim not merely to describe comparative national truth
commission experiences, but rather to analyze and reflect on lessons
learned for promoting the effective implementation of truth commission
recommendations. In so doing, they aim to document the reasons behind the
relative success rates with implementation in four distinct national contexts:
South Korea, Cambodia, Peru, and South Africa. They explain the particular approaches taken to implementation, the web of actors involved in the
implementation process, and the lessons learned about what worked, what
did not work, and how, looking back, the implementation process might
have been restructured to achieve better results.
Drafts of these contributions were presented at a major international
conference, "Implementing Truth and Reconciliation: Comparative Lessons
for Korea," held at the State University of New York at Buffalo on October
24, 2011.14 Convened in response to the release of the TRCK's final report,
the conference aimed to help fill important gaps in the existing literature
with respect to South Korea's decades-long "transitional justice" experience. 15 That experience has been notable in many respects, particularly in
TRCK's 2010 Comprehensive Report, these recommendations were not officially translated by the TRCK, as was Part I of Volume 1.
12. See discussion infra in Part IV.
13. A more comprehensive research agenda in this regard is proposed in the concluding contribution. See Tara J. Melish, Truth Commission Impact: Toward a Participation-BasedImplementation Agenda, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 273 (2012).
14. The conference was convened jointly by the Baldy Center for Law and Social
Policy, the Buffalo Human Rights Center, and the Asian Studies Program.
15. For purposes of this symposium, we employ Naomi Roht-Arraiza's definition
of transitional justice: "that set of practices, mechanisms and concerns that arise following a period of conflict, civil strife or repression, and that are aimed directly at confronting and dealing with past violations of human rights and humanitarian law." Naomi
Roht-Arriaza, The New Landscape of TransitionalJustice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 2 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena eds.,
2006). South Korea's experience is not well represented in the transitional justice literature. Even within the limited scholarship that does address it, the analysis tends to be
limited to mechanism-specific descriptive accounts. None focus on the process of postmechanism implementation of recommendations or findings.
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the number, diversity, and sequencing of the transitional justice initiatives
undertaken. In an effort to bring these experiences to light and to glean
lessons from other national experiences that might inform the Korean implementation process, experts in transitional justice were thus brought together to discuss the factors that contribute to or hinder the effective
implementation of truth commission recommendations and other efforts
aimed at achieving national, community and individual-level reconciliation.
Such lessons are offered in the hope of assisting victim groups and other
advocacy communities in South Korea as they engage the much longer process of implementing truth and reconciliation in the Republic of Korea.
In introducing the Special Issue, the present contribution proceeds in
five parts. Part I provides a short introduction to the TRCK and its recommendations. Parts II and III aim to gather lessons for the implementation
process from comparative national and cross-national experiences. Part II
focuses on intra-national lessons, drawing from the multiple transitional
justice processes that have taken place in Korea over the last sixty-five
years. The accompanying essays, all by Korean scholars, cast a critical gaze
at South Korea's experience with the TRCK, placing it in the context of the
unusually large number of transitional justice mechanisms undertaken in
16
South Korea since the early stages of democratization in the mid-1980s.
By comparing the TRCK to these sister processes, the essays aim to tease
out some of the strategic lessons that might be drawn from the latter's comparative successes and failures, with a view to strengthening the prospects
for effective implementation of the TRCK's recommendations.
Part III further broadens the comparative lens by assessing distinct aspects of the transitional justice experiences of three other nations: Cambodia, Peru, and South Africa. While no experience can provide a blue-print
for processes developed in other social, political, economic and historical
contexts, important lessons, insights, and cautionary tales may nevertheless
be drawn from these experiences. There is, in this sense, much to learn from
the comparative experiences of the more than forty other truth commissions
that have undertaken work in countries around the world. 17 Such commis16. In December 1987, Roh Tae-woo was elected in South Korea's first free democratic elections, bringing thirty-five years of authoritarian rule to a formal end. A number of prior transitional justice measures had been initiated during brief periods of
liberalization to respond to past human rights abuses in 1948 and the 1960s, but, given
strong perpetrator push-back, none had produced results of note. See Hun Joon Kim,
infra note 74, at 137.
17. See generally David Backer, Cross-National Comparative Analysis, in AsSESSING TJ IMPACT, supra note 8, at 23, 23 (defending utility of cross-national comparative analysis as a methodology for empirical research in transitional justice, while
recognizing need for caution).
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sions have taken a diversity of forms, responded to distinct kinds of violence over distinct periods of time, and, given the diversity of approaches
taken, had a wide variety of success rates with the implementation of their
final recommendations. The essays in this Part correspondingly highlight
lessons that might be drawn from three prominent national experiences, particularly in the areas of community-level reconciliation (Cambodia), individual economic reparations (Peru), and memorialization initiatives (South
Africa).
Part IV turns attention back to the TRCK's multiple recommendations
and the details of their formulation. Such formulation, it is contended,
presents important opportunities and constraints that must be taken closely
into account by all relevant stakeholders in the implementation process. Finally, Part V concludes with global lessons aimed at strengthening implementation in South Korea. It highlights in particular the critical importance
of active civil society engagement and creative implementation entrepreneurship, the creation of permanent follow-up bodies, pursuing truth as an
ongoing project, data accessibility and independence, and the use of measurable indicators for monitoring and holding government and other key
actors to account.
The Special Issue closes with an essay that returns to the question of
implementation and how best to assess truth commission impact.18 Underscoring recent research that suggests that truth commissions do not appear
in practice to produce any direct improvements in either the human rights
record or democratic development of transitional societies (and may in fact
negatively correlate with human rights improvements),' 9 it argues for a new
research agenda that focuses more directly on the social and institutional
dynamics of implementation. Such a research agenda would diverge from
many current directions in the scholarship. These dominant strands have
tended to look either overly inward to the internal functioning of truth commissions or overly outward at perception surveys or standardized quantitative cross-national human rights and democratization metrics in assessing
18. See Melish, Truth Commission Impact, supra note 13.

19. See

ERIC WIEBELHAUS-BRAHM,

TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND TRANSITIONAL SO-

(2010) (finding that truth
commissions have an overall negative impact on human rights practices and no significant impact on democracy based on large-N cross-national statistical regression analysis, but pointing to four case studies of positive correlation); TRICIA D. OLSEN ET AL.,
CIETIES: THE IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN BALANCE: COMPARING PROCESSES, WEIGHING EFFICACY

153

(2010) (finding that truth commissions, when used alone, have a significant negative
effect on both democracy and human rights measures); Tricia D. Olsen et al., The Justice Balance: When TransitionalJustice Improves Human Rights and Democracy, 32
HUM. RTS. Q. 980 (2010) (same).
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commission "success" or "impact." Both efforts fail, I argue, at taking account of what is perhaps the most significant contributing factor to-and
indicator of-truth commission success: the level of civil society engagement in the process of implementing its final recommendations and policy
prescriptions.
Two opening contributions follow this Introduction. The first is a transcript of the powerful testimonial remarks of Dr. Theresa Chun, a victimsurvivor of the Korean War who has committed herself to ensuring that
atrocities like those that befell her brother, Luke, do not happen again. She
spoke compellingly at the conference about her brother's disappearance and
its impact on her life and life project over the last sixty years. The second
contribution is the first-ever English-language translation of the TRCK's
final recommendations. Although an official English translation of Volume
I of the TRCK's four-volume report was formally commissioned by the
TRCK, the body's final "integrated" recommendations were deliberately
omitted from that translation. 20 At the same time, the official translation is
not available on the TRCK's official website or any other government site,
and is effectively inaccessible to the global public in hardcopy. 2 1 Taken
together with the lack of broad public dissemination of the official Korean
language report and recommendations, 22 these omissions raise significant
concerns regarding the government's commitment to broad public scrutiny
of and civic engagement with the TRCK's findings and recommendations.
20. The official reason provided for this omission was that "the Truth and Reconciliation Commission had yet to approve [the integrated recommendations] when the
Commission contracted to publish the English version of the Comprehensive Report."
COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4 (translator's note). Given the ease with
which the inclusion of the recommendations could have been covered prospectively by
the contract, and the insignificance of the additional resources such inclusion would
have entailed, this explanation is far from satisfying.
21. A search in WorldCAT, a searchable global database of the holdings of 72,000
libraries in 170 countries and territories (including South Korea), reveals that only
seven participating libraries worldwide hold a copy of the English translation of the
TRCK's Final Report. Six of the holdings are in the United States, while one is in
London. See WorldCAT facts and statistics, http://www.oclc.orgfus/en/worldcaU
statistics/default.htm. My gratitude to John Mondo and Nina Cascio of the SUNY Buffalo Law library for running this search.
22. The Korean language report is available on the TRCK's official website, although that website has ceased being maintained since the Commission's mandate came
to an end. In other national contexts, truth commissions have employed a variety of
measures to disseminate their findings, including not only posting on the internet, but
printing them in the nation's major newspapers and widely distributing copies, including in shortened popular forms. In some cases, they have been reproduced as children's
books and graphic novels. See WIEBELHAUS-BRAHM, supra note 19, at 159.
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Such concerns are deepened in light of earlier efforts in 2010 to ban distribution of the TRCK's 2009 interim English-language report. 23 That report
likewise included an important set of recommendations and policy prescriptions for ensuring that the processes begun by the TRCK would have lasting
societal impact.
It is emblematic in this regard that none of the contributors to the symposium, including those expert on Korean transitional justice, cited to the
TRCK's final "integrated" recommendations in their original submissions.
They focused instead on the interim recommendations issued by the more
liberally constituted commission in 2009, recommendations which arguably
24
lack the legal status of those included in the final report.
By publishing the final recommendations here in English translation
for the first time, we hope to draw greater public and policy attention to
them, both nationally and internationally. In so doing, we hope to aid Korean initiatives to use them as leverage for transforming the relationships,
policies, and institutions that allowed abuses to manifest over so many
years. It is largely on the basis of such implementation, and the civil society
dynamics created in response, we contend, that the long-term success of the
TRCK may be judged.
I.
A.

THE TRCK AND ITS RECOMMENDATIONS

Origins and Mandate

The TRCK was not Korea's first attempt at transitional justice. As the
articles in this Special Issue stress, in the two and a half decades since the
introduction of democratic reforms, South Korea has pursued not only a
limited set of high-level prosecutions and non-criminal sanctions, but has
undertaken more special investigations of past human rights abuses within
23. In early 2010, as one of his first acts of office, incoming TRCK President Lee
Young-jo banned the further distribution of the English report citing translation errors.
The real cause was widely understood to be Lee's ideological disagreement with the
Commission's findings and the new ruling Conservative Party's discomfort with the
report's strong conclusions, which held prior rightist governments responsible for
abuses. See, e.g., ForbiddenBook Haunts Truth Commission, KOREA TIMES, April 6,
2010; Leigh Payne, Banning of English Report on Findings, KOREA TIMES, April 15,

2010; Lee Tae-hoon, Truth Commission Sued for PoliticalCensorship, KOREA TIMES,
May 6, 2010; Hamish McDonald, Truth in Dangerin South Korea, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Jan. 23, 2010. It was likewise under Lee's chairmanship that the TRCK contracted for the English translation of only Part I of Volume 1 of its Final Report, ex-

cluding the contents of its recommendations. See supra note 2020 and accompanying
text.
24. See discussion infra at Part IV.
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its national borders and created more truth commissions than any other
country. 25 This includes, by one estimate, an astonishing eighteen truth
commissions since 1996 to deal with the historical legacies of Korea's authoritarian and colonial past. 26 Nonetheless, for multiple reasons, virtually

all of these truth commissions have been created with highly limited temporal or subject matter mandates. Each has been created to respond to a discrete incident, uprising or massacre 27 or, alternatively, to a particular kind
or target of abuse, such as "suspicious deaths" or victims involved in the
"democratization movement, '2s within highly constricted timeframes.
The TRCK was designed to be different. The first "comprehensive"
truth commission in Korea's history (indeed, in all of Northeast Asia), 29 its
mandate was extended to cover almost the entire twentieth century. Empowered to investigate cases and events occurring from 1910 through the
1990s, it was tasked with seeking the truth about abuses during (1) Japanese
colonialism and its run-up, (2) the Korean War and the years immediately
30
preceding it, and (3) the post-War decades of military-authoritarian rule.
It was, moreover, tasked not only with investigating the abusive acts of
state actors, but also, controversially, the "terrorist acts" and atrocities committed by "parties that denied the legitimacy of or were hostile towards the
Republic of Korea," that is, North Korean soldiers and local South Korean
25. This particular combination of transitional justice measures-limited trials, an
effective amnesty for the vast majority of remaining perpetrators, accompanied by truth
commission investigations-has, interestingly, been found by certain scholars using
certain "large N" cross-national statistical regressions to be most conducive for achieving stronger democracies and human rights records. See OLSEN ET AL., supra note 19, at
159.

26. See COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 25-26. Transitional justice
scholars have nevertheless disagreed about the proper definition of a truth commission
and hence what the relevant universe of cases includes. See, e.g., HAYNER, supra note 6,
at 10 ("There is still no single, broadly accepted definition of what constitutes a truth
commission."); Geoff Dancy et al., The Turn to Truth: Trends in Truth Commission
Experimentation, 9 J. HUM. RTS. 45, 47 (2010).
27. See COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 25-26 (noting review commis-

sions established to investigate the "incidents" at Geochang, Jeju, No Gun Ri, and the
Samcheong Training Camp, among others).
28. See id. (noting Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths and Review Committee on Restoring Honor and Compensating Activists of the Democratization Movement, among others).
29. As Kim Dong-Choon points out, the TRCK is the first comprehensive pastdealing project in all of Northeast Asia that seeks to document and redress grave human
rights abuses committed by the victims' own government. Kim Dong-Choon, infra note
65, at 98.
30. See Framework Act, supra note 4, art. 2(1).
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communists or sympathizers. 3 1 The expansive mandate even included the
nationalist activities of anti-colonial crusaders in the period between 1910
and 1945, which were to be "honored. 3 2 The breadth of this mandate, alternately characterized as a major strength or weakness of the TRCK, can
be attributed to three dynamic and overlapping influences: the powerful organized demands of civil society and victims' rights groups; liberal political
pragmatism, especially regarding victim reparations; and the self-insulating
push-back of a conservative party that could no longer fully resist public
demands for a more comprehensive past-dealing project.
Most immediately, the TRCK's 2005 creation-eighteen years after
formal transition to democracy-owes in major part to growing civil society dissatisfaction with the coverage gaps and limitations of the earlier,
more limited truth-seeking projects. Victims' groups, including the Pan-National Committee on Verifying Massacres and the National Committee of
the Bereaved Families of the Korean War Victims, were particularly displeased by the dissolution in 2004 of the Presidential Commission on Suspi33
cious Deaths without having resolved a number of high profile cases.
They were similarly irritated by the temporal limitations placed on the investigatory powers of other truth-seeking bodies, especially those tasked
with investigating abuses against democracy activists. 34 These limitations
led to nation-wide public demonstrations and growing calls for the creation
of a comprehensive truth commission that would cover all state-sponsored
abuses from the Korean War through the early 1990s. A Pan-National Committee for Clarification of the Past (PNCCP) was correspondingly formed
by civil society activists in 2004 to draft a proposed legislative bill, investing the envisioned body with exceptionally strong powers of investigation
35
and sanction.
Operating in a political system characterized by a negotiated transition
and strong party competition, the ruling liberal (Uri) party, meanwhile, had
long favored transitional justice initiatives; it had championed each of the
31. Id. at 2(l)(5); COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 30, 33, 100-102. The
controversial nature of this mandate stems from the fact that truth commissions are
often defined as bodies tasked with investigating official state abuses,not those of nonstate actors, although this appears to be changing.
32. Such activities included those of the "anti-Japanese independence movements"
and "[e]fforts by overseas Koreans to uphold Korea's sovereignty and enhance Korea's
national prestige since liberation from [] Japanese colonial rule." See COMPREHENSIVE
REPORT, supra note 1,at 33.
33. See Kuk Cho, Transitional Justice in Korea: Legally Coping with Past
Wrongs After Democratization, 16 PACIFIC RIM L. & POL'Y J. 579, 602, 607 (2007).
34. See id. at 607.
35. See COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 27-28.
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earlier, more limited truth-seeking projects created between 1996 and 2004.
By 2004, however, the limits of many of those projects had become clear.
From a practical-administrative perspective, this was particularly true with
respect to victim reparation. Each special act recognized a highly variable
administrative reparation scheme for its recognized beneficiaries, with compensatory quanta ranging from zero to a few thousand dollars depending on
beneficiary identity and legislative sequencing. The vast majority of victims
meanwhile remained uncovered. The fear that such an erratic, piecemeal
approach would lead to a never-ending cycle of special legislation recognizing increasingly large reparations awards for discretely organized victim
groups, led President Roh Moo-hyn in 2004 to underscore the need for
"comprehensive efforts to settle the past based on universal methods." 36 His
liberal party strongly supported the TRCK's creation, albeit with signifi37
cantly scaled back powers from those proposed by the PNCCP.
The opposition conservative (GNP) party pushed back. Although it
recognized that it could not hold back the tide of public support in Korea
for a more comprehensive truth commission, it demanded certain concessions as part of the negotiation process. These included radically limited
investigatory powers for the TRCK 38 and, simultaneously, a dramatically
expanded mandate to cover the activities of a wide range of non-state actors. 39 The fact that both demands were ultimately incorporated into the
TRCK's Framework Act suggested to some that the TRCK, a reflection of
the negotiated transition and the continuing power of past perpetrators in
government, would not fully escape the state-sponsored narrative of the past
40
that had long silenced memory in Korea.
36. Id. at 27.
37. Id. at 28.
38. Arguing that an obsession with the past could cause disproportionate spending
and a burden on the economy, the GNP party preferred that the clarification of the past
be limited to an academic study of modem history carried out by a new research body
under the umbrella of the National Academy of Sciences. Id. at 29.
39. Id. At the same time, the TRCK's investigation of human rights abuses during
the authoritarian regimes was limited to "gross" violations. Id. at 108-109 (explaining
that cases based on violations of freedom of speech and press, property rights, and the
right to work were dismissed unless found to be violated in combination).
40. See, e.g., Jeon Seung-Hee, War Trauma, Memories, and Truths: Representations of the Korean War in Pak Wan-so's Writings and in "Still Present Pasts," 42
CRITICAL ASIAN STUDIES 623, 624 (2010). The TRCK's final report nonetheless concluded that its "biggest finding" was that "the claims of unlawful civilian killings by the
military and police nationwide turned out to be true." "For over sixty years," the commission concluded, "there had been victims but no offenders, and some incidents were
denied altogether. However, the commission's investigation verified that the tragic killings did indeed take place." COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 181.
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A highly selective public memory of the past has indeed long been
fostered in Korea, one in which state responsibility for war-related atrocities
and subsequent human rights abuse became unacknowledgable. The Korean
War has, for example, been described as the "forgotten war," with the experiences of vast numbers of Koreans erased from public consciousness
under a state-promoted narrative of the war as a Manichean contest between
good and evil. 41 Through decades of state manipulation, monitoring, and
censorship of civilian knowledge production and civic activities, the role of
South Korean and U.S. forces in committing mass atrocities has been sanitized from the record, and victims silenced T'rom speaking about them
42
through fear.
The TRCK was created to help broaden this unilateral memory and
clarify the truth of long silenced events. In this sense, the start of its mandate in 1910 makes historical sense. It was in that year that imperial Japan
colonized the Korean peninsula, initiating thirty-five years of oppressive
colonial rule aimed at erasing Korean cultural and political identity. 43 Despite strong nationalist sentiment, Japan's 1945 defeat in World War II did
not, however, bring democratic self-rule to the Korean peninsula. Rather, a
UN-backed occupation divided the peninsula into two separate Korean
states north and south of the 38th parallel, one administered by the U.S.
military, the other by the Soviets. Rising Cold War ideological tensions and
the difficulties of foreign administration led, in turn, to two developments
with devastating societal consequences. First, in an effort to ease administration, the U.S. occupation government called back into service many of
the abusive officials, police, and military officers from the pre-war colonial
era, effectively reconsolidating the colonial power structure." Second, as
independence brought growing public demands for the purging of "pro-Japanese collaborators," 45 these reconsolidated officials responded to the na41. See Jeon, supra note 40, at 624.
42. See id. at 624-26 (discussing role of South Korean state in affirmatively shaping public memory and promoting unilateral memory in post-war era by strictly
manipulating, monitoring and censoring civilian activities).
43. In August 1995, Japan's prime minister issued an official apology for its colonial activities in Korea, admitting that Japan had, "through its colonial rule and invasion, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries,
particularly to those of Asian nations." Sheryl WuDunn, JapaneseApology for War is
Welcomed and Criticized, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 1995).
44. See COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 1,at 12.
45. In 1948, for example, the Special Law on Punishing Anti-Nation Activities
was adopted by the Korean legislature to punish pro-Japanese collaborators, with a Special Investigation Committee established to carry out its mandate. The Committee's
work was nonetheless immediately thwarted by the administration of President Rhee
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tionalist threat by adopting an increasingly virulent and totalizing anticommunist ideology. 46 Local authorities and their paramilitary allies used
that ideology to justify the systematic suppression of nationalist political
dissent, and ultimately the mass murder of civilians.
Untold numbers of South Koreans were subsequently killed in the tumultuous and fearful years between independence and the Korean War,
mostly for suspected collaborationist activities with rebel troops or as reprisals for suspected activities of others. 47 "Clean field operations" were used
to wipe out entire civilian communities, and commanders were given widespread powers of immediate execution under martial law. 48 The subsequent
three-year Korean War between the U.S.-backed South and Soviet and Chinese-backed North was one of the most destructive of the twentieth century.
Caught in the cross-fire, ten percent of the Korean population (three million
Korean civilians) were killed, with ten million separated from their families. 49 It has been reported that more bombs were dropped in Korea than on
all of Europe during World War II and more napalm was used than during
the more than two-decades-long Vietnam War.50 And, yet, the details of,
and responsibilities for, these civilian and humanitarian abuses have remained effectively unacknowledged; a situation solidified with the 1953 ar-

Syung-Man and right-wing attacks on the committee, and hence no meaningful outcomes were produced. See id. at 12-13; Cho, supra note 33, at 588 n. 42 (2007). This
failure largely explains Korea's 2004 adoption, fifty-six years later, of the Special Act
for Finding the Truth of Anti-Nation Activities Under Japanese Occupation. For a discussion of this Act, see Baik, infra note 81.
46. See Jae-Jung Suh, Truth andReconciliation in South Korea: Confronting War,
Colonialism and Intervention in the Asian Pacific, 42 CRITICAL ASIAN STUDIES 503,

516 (2010) ("[T]he former collaborators quickly transformed themselves into anticommunists and redeemed themselves as patriots who fought against Korean communists as
alleged Soviet-sponsored traitors ....
[T]hey reintroduced torture, martial law, the National Security Law, and other oppressive measures.").
47. See, e.g., Suh Hee-Kyung, Atrocities Before and During the Korean War:
Mass CivilianKillings by South Korean and U.S. Forces, 42 CRITICAL ASIAN STUDIES
553, 555-65 (2010) (reviewing cases verified by the TRCK); id. at 559 ("Such acts of
alleged collaboration included the provision of meals, accommodations, or manual labor to help the rebel troops and guerrillas.").

48. Id. at 560, 564.
49. See Jeon, supra note 40, at 624.
50. See id.; see also BRUCE CUMINGS,
HISTORY

KOREA'S PLACE IN THE SUN:

A

MODERN

289-90 (1997) (attributing civilian death toll of more than two million people

during the Korean War to America's use of napalm strikes on villages and policy of
breaking massive dams to flood Korea's northern valleys).
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mistice between North and South Korea, which brought neither an end to
51
the war nor peace.
A succession of harsh military and autocratic regimes ruled South Korea for the next thirty-five years. Employing repressive and violent means

to quash political dissent and make "opponents disappear in silent anonymity," 52 each used a rabid anti-communist ideology, the priority of rapid
state-led economic growth, and the security threat from across what remains
the world's most heavily-fortified border to justify the maintenance of its
own power through systematic human rights abuse. That abuse has been
targeted particularly at reformers, pro-democracy activists, and their families. It has ranged from massacres, assassination and other "suspicious
deaths," to torture, ill-treatment, fabricated trials and unlawful detentions, to
wide-scale censorship and "preventative" imprisonment in concentration or
"re-education" camps, to systematic loss of jobs, property, academic degrees and professional employment credentials for those supporting or par53
ticipating in democracy movements.
Although the period of authoritarian rule finally ended in 1987 with
constitutional reforms and the beginning of democratization, twenty-five
years later Korea remains a divided country, both physically and politically. 54 Significant infringements on freedoms of speech, association, and
the press continue, largely justified on grounds of national security and the
real and imagined threats from across the border. 55 A silence about the past
has remained, carrying with it a widely-experienced, if publicly unacknowl-

51. The two Koreas remain technically at war after their 1950-53 war ended in a

truce.
52. Hannah Arendt, A Reporter at Large, V-Eichmann in Jerusalem, THE NEW
Mar. 16, 1963, at 58 (describing common tactic of totalitarian regimes).
53. See, e.g., COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 82-89, 107-109, 123-33;
Cho, supra note 33, at 597-602.
54. The Demilitarized Zone, or DMZ, still separates North and South Korea.
55. The National Security Law, for example, continues to criminalize speech in
support of Communism or North Korea, giving rise to almost a hundred cases annually.
See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: CURTAILING FREE-

YORKER,

DOM OF EXPRESSION AND ASSOCIATION IN THE NAME OF SECURITY IN THE REPUBLIC OF

3, 19, 20 (2012); Amnesty International, Press Release, South Korea: The Politically Motivated Onslaught on Free Speech, Nov. 29, 2012, available at http:Hwww.
amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/south-korea-politically-motivated-onslaughtfree-speech-2012-11-29 (noting "dramatic increase in the abuse of national security
laws in a politically motivated attempt to silence debate," including "a 95.6% increase
over the past four years (2008 to 2011) in the number of people questioned on suspicion
of violating the National Security Law").
KOREA
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edged, intergenerational transfer of trauma. 56 A fractured society with ideological fault-lines continues to engender political disputes and
confrontations in the South today, even as spectacular economic growth in
the 1960s, seventies, and eighties has placed South Korea among the
57
world's highest income countries.
B.

The TRCK's Recommendations

Within this fractured context, the TRCK was created to help "foster
national legitimacy" and "reconcile the past for the sake of national
unity. '58 To achieve these ends, the Commission was mandated to investigate a broad set of cases from the past (as submitted within a one-year
window) and, based on its findings and conclusions, to present recommendations for state remedial measures to the President and National Assembly
in a comprehensive final report.5 9 Such remedial measures, which the government "shall respect and attempt to implement," 60 were to fall into any of
eight broadly specified categories. These included measures designed to:
"rectify the damage and honor" of victims; "account for unverified investigation results"; "prevent past incidents from reoccurring"; abolish or reform
laws, policies and practices; support reconciliation with perpetrators; further
develop national reconciliation and democracy; promote human rights education and historical consciousness; and "[o]ther matters that the Commis61
sion deems necessary to achieve the purposes of th[e] Act."
Liberally interpreting its mandate to issue state remedial measures in
each of these broad categories, the TRCK in fact issued three distinct sets of
recommendations. These included a set of "final" recommendations published in its December 2010 comprehensive report (as textually mandated in
the Framework Act). They also included an important set of interim policy
recommendations issued just before an internal political transition within
the Commission and, most controversially, case-specific recommendations
corresponding to each and every petition it verified. Context suggests that
the latter two sets of recommendations were internal TRCK responses to a
56. See Jeon, supra note 40, at 637-39 (noting transfer to second generation Korean Americans); see also COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 157 (discussing
post-traumatic stress disorder experienced by victims and their families).
57. South Korea is presently one of the world's fifteenth largest economies. See
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database:Reportfor Selected
Countries and Subjects (2012).
58. Framework Act, supra note 4, art. 1.
59. Id. art. 32(1).
60. Id. art. 32(5) (emphasis added).
61. Id. art. 32(4).
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changing national political environment that was becoming increasingly
hostile to its work. The decision to issue case-specific recommendations
thus came in 2007 just before a national political election forecast to bring
the conservatives back to power. The TRCK's interim measures, in turn,
were issued in 2009 just as the TRCK's Presidency was set to transition to a
more conservative leader known for his antagonism toward the TRCK and
62
other past-dealing projects.
The details of these three sets of recommendations will be returned to
more comprehensively in Part IV. Three points related to their effective
implementation nonetheless merit special attention with respect to them
here, especially in light of the dynamic political context highlighted above.
First, in contrast to the specificity and detail associated with more recent
truth commission reports, 63 the concluding TRCK made only seventeen final recommendations in 2010, each presented at a very high level of generality. Second, although put forth as "integrated," 64 the final
recommendations do not in fact substantively incorporate the commission's
2009 interim measures. The two sets of recommendations in fact appear to
be in tension in many important respects. Third, direct inconsistencies appear to exist between several of the TRCK's final recommendations and
those issued by concurrently operating specialized truth commissions in
South Korea. All three of these considerations will need to be closely attended by advocates and other stakeholders in the implementation process
ahead. They are thus useful to keep in mind in reading the important and
insightful contributions that follow.

62. See supra note 23.
63. See HAYNER, supra note 6, at 192 ("While some of the earlier truth commission reports provided only very brief and general recommendations, later commissions
have been much more extensive, usually including a full and detailed chapter outlining
specific reforms across many sectors of government and public life."). Hayner cites
multiple examples:
The El Salvador report's recommendations ran to fifteen pages, South Africa's to
forty-five pages, Chile's to fifty-five pages, and Liberia's to sixty-two pages. The
Sierra Leone report includes over eighty pages of recommendations, plus a useful
twenty-page summary table. In Morocco, the recommendations ran for over one
hundred pages, and in Peru the recommendations section reached almost 200
pages, including a proposed draft law for a follow-up committee.
Id. By contrast, the TRCK's final recommendations cover a mere 13 pages.
64. COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 1,at 3.
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II.

COMPARATIVE LESSONS FROM SOUTH KOREA

The first three essays in this Special Issue are penned by Korean scholars expert in transitional justice initiatives in South Korea. They were asked
to critically assess the work of the TRCK, the prospects for implementation
of its recommendations, and the lessons that might inform it from other
past-dealing processes in South Korea, especially those in which final recommendations were likewise issued. Their essays raise a variety of valuable
considerations that will need to be taken closely into account looking
forward.
A.

Assessing the TRCK's Operations

The first of these essays is authored by Kim Dong-Choon, a former
standing commissioner of the TRCK and long-time advocate of transitional
justice projects in South Korea. 65 As a commission insider, he provides a
detailed descriptive analysis of the TRCK, including its genesis, mandate,
and composition, as well as its jurisdictional and investigative powers. Kim
acknowledges the commission's hard-fought accomplishments, including
local and regional memorial services undertaken around the country, a public apology by the President for the government's illegal exercise of state
power during the Korean War, the exhumation of many hidden massacre
sites, the correction of the Family Registry in many individual cases, and
the retrial of about twenty people wrongly prosecuted on false espionage
charges to clear their names and award compensation. 66 He nonetheless focuses his analysis on the slow and uneven implementation record with respect to the majority of the TRCK's macro policy and institutional
recommendations. As he notes, while the government has tended to implement the easiest and most perfunctory of recommended measures, it has
effectively failed to touch any of the politically sensitive or financially burdensome recommendations. Many measures, such as official apologies
from government bureaus, a comprehensive reparations law, and revision of
historical records, he observes, have never even been discussed in govern67
ment for possible implementation.

Skeptical that this record will improve in the future, he attributes this
disappointing record to multiple factors. Most significant among them is the
political context in which the TRCK was created and has had to operate,
especially since 2008. This context is characterized by two central con65. Kim Dong-Choon, Korea's Truth and Reconciliation Commission: An Overview and Assessment, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 97 (2012).
66. See id. at 10-11.
67. See id. at 113.
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straints, both a result of the negotiated nature of the Korean transition. The
first is the persistence of strong anti-communist sentiments and Cold War
ideology in Korea. Indeed, because the ideology used to justify human
rights violations over the last fifty years is still operative in the nation,
spurred to some degree by the proximity of North Korea, it has been difficult for many to recognize the wrongs committed in the name of anti-communism and that those who perpetrated them might not be national heroes. 68
This context has led not only to skepticism of the TRCK in large segments
of the general public and media, but also to lack of cooperation with the
Commission's investigations by prominent state institutions, especially
those most actively engaged in abuses of the past, such as the Intelligence
Service, the National Police, and the Ministry of Defense.
Closely related, many of Korea's most prominent offenders and perpetrators still occupy important roles in state institutions and are represented
in the major political parties, including the current administration. This reality, Kim suggests, has led not only to the TRCK's premature shut down and
lack of official cooperation with its investigations, but also, he emphasizes,
to an overbroad mandate that significantly diluted the focus of the TRCK
and constrained its ability to complete its work within the allocated timeframe.
The negotiated political compromise that created the TRCK had other
limiting effects on its ability to carry out its work. Kim focuses on three.
First, although the original proposal would have granted strong investigatory authority to the commission, including the ability to hold hearings, to
prosecute for noncompliance, to lift statutory limitations, and to search, inspect and apply for search warrants, the final Framework Act failed to give
the TRCK any significant enforcement power. As a result, it could not compel state officials or other witnesses to provide testimony or documents
other than through the threat of fine. 69 At the same time, its recommendations were to be non-binding and it was not authorized to punish perpetrators, even when their wrongdoing was plainly established. Second, under
the Framework Act, the commissioners were to be selected by political authorities, such that political orientation played a central role in the TRCK's
composition. This had an important constraining effect on the TRCK's
work, Kim observes, because the political backgrounds of the Commissioners inhibited reaching consensus. As a result, all decisions were taken by
mere majority vote, rather than arrived at through deliberative consensus.

68. See id. at 105, 108.
69. See id. at 107. As Kim notes, this power was never in fact ever used. See id. at
n.30.
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The inability to reach political consensus, taken together with the
TRCK's extensive mandate and time constraints, also led the commission to
adopt a very narrow understanding of the "truth" it was mandated to investigate. As Kim describes, the TRCK opted for a model in which investigators focused on validating the forensic truth of each individual incident,
rather than constructing a broader narrative of what happened and why. As
a result, Kim observes, the TRCK was not able to document adequately the
causes, conditions, and systems that gave rise to abuses, nor was it able to
facilitate true reconciliation among the various sectors of Korean society
70
that carried out and suffered those abuses.
Taken together with a rise in neoliberal discourse and onset of economic crisis at the TRCK's creation, these limiting effects have not only
significantly hamstrung the TRCK's effectiveness and ability to carry out
its work, but have also led to a waning of public interest in the TRCK's
work. Especially in combination with the political rhetoric of the GNP
Party and the conservative press, such limitations can, Kim suggests, thus
help to explain the Korean public's sense of fatigue about repeated efforts
to uncover the past.
What, then, is to be taken from this experience? Kim identifies two
important lessons. The first is the imperative of recognizing that, in divided
societies, political support for transitional justice processes will be variable
and is very likely to wane precisely at the point when implementation is set
to begin. Given this reality, questions of implementation must be taken into
explicit account at the design stage. Second, and relatedly, given the likelihood of official reticence to fulfill truth commission mandates and recommendations, the ultimate goal of any truth commission should be the
empowerment of civil society to take forward the justice project. That is, a
truth commission's final report should not be seen as the end goal. Rather, it
should be seen as a jumping off point for a much broader societal effort to
transform itself and ensure that the abuses of the past cannot occur again.
In thinking through how this broader effort might be promoted in
South Korea and hence how to ensure that the TRCK's efforts contribute to
lasting change, Kim offers three concrete steps that should be taken by the
government. First, because many victims did not bring forward petitions in
the limited time available for doing so, Kim asserts, there is a need to reopen the opportunity for victims to submit petitions for investigation and
historical clarification. To allow this truth-seeking process to continue, Kim
proposes that either the investigative mandate of the TRCK be extended or
a permanent post be created within government to serve the same func70. See id. at 106.
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tion. 71This proposal mirrors in many ways the TRCK's 2009 interim policy
recommendation to create a Permanent Foundation for Research, Education
and Memory, a body in fact already expressly contemplated in the TRCK's
Framework Act. 72 As highlighted in Part IV, the fact that this recommendation was not integrated into the TRCK's Comprehensive Report as a final
recommendation raises a question as to the government's understanding of
its duty to implement it.
Second, the government should authorize a comprehensive law on economic reparations for victims and other restorative measures, such as apologies by key government bureaucracies. Doing so would assist in the
reconciliation process by acknowledging officially and concretely that the
state was responsible for gross human rights abuses of its citizens. In so
doing, Kim suggests, the government should likewise seek to address historical abuses undertaken by the U.S. government during the Korean war,
as these were insufficiently investigated by the TRCK. Again, it is concerning that the proposal for a more comprehensive reparations law, proposed
by the TRCK in 2009, 7 3 was not included in the TRCK's final policy recommendations in its Comprehensive Report.
Finally, Kim observes, the government should establish mechanisms
for broadly disseminating and preserving information on the history of
human rights abuses in Korea. Doing so will allow civil society to take
forward the justice project, including by creating their own narratives about
the truth of the past, diagnoses of causes, and agendas for action.
B.

The Jeju Truth Commission

In his piece, scholar Hun Joon Kim comes to a very similar set of
conclusions. 74 He does so, however, through a different discursive path and
distinct historical perspective. Recognizing that very little attention has
been given to the Korean experience within the broader transitional justice
community, he begins by providing a comprehensive descriptive overview
of state violence in Korea over the last hundred years, including under each
of the four distinct periods investigated by the TRCK: Japanese colonialism, the U.S. occupation, the Korean War, and the subsequent military and
authoritarian regimes. He then details the multiple and varied transitional
71. See id. at 124.

72. See discussion infra Part IV(B)(2).
73. The TRCK's 2009 interim recommendation was nonetheless limited to reparations for victims of civilian massacres between 1948 and 1953. See discussion infra
Part IV(B)(1).
74. See Hun Joon Kim, Trial and Errorin Transitional Justice: Learningfrom
South Korea's Truth Commissions, 19 BuFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 125 (2012).
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justice initiatives that have been undertaken in South Korea to address
abuses in each of these distinct periods, a set of initiatives that are globally
unique, particularly in their surprising number and density.
What do these experiences teach us, Kim asks, about the kinds of policy interventions that should be pursued to enhance the likelihood that the
TRCK's recommendations will effectively be implemented? To provide answers, Kim compares the experiences of two of South Korea's most prominent truth commissions: the TRCK and the National Commission for the
Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju April 3 Events ("Jeju Commission"). The latter was created by special act in 2000 to investigate the mass
killing of civilians by the police, military, and rightist youth group that followed a 1948 uprising on Jeju island by a group of communist rebels. The
comparison between the two commissions is potentially instructive, Kim
suggests, given key shared structural similarities, including an investigatory
focus on physical integrity violations (massacres and disappearances) and a
temporal focus on the years between independence and the end of the Korean War (1945-1954). Such issues remain politically charged and ideologically controversial in South Korea and hence have engendered strong
resistance to both commissions from the conservative and anti-communist
75
sectors of Korean society, particularly from the military and police.
Despite these parallels, the two truth commissions have nonetheless
had very different experiences with the implementation of their respective
recommendations. The Jeju Commission has had a particularly successful
record, while the TRCK has fared less well. What accounts for this difference? In seeking an answer, Hun Joon Kim discounts several of the dominant explanations offered by commentators, including those by Kim DongChoon in his essay. Namely, given that the Jeju Commission was created
and operated in an almost identical political context, with equal ideological
opposition, and with even less enforcement powers than the TRCK, Hun
Joon Kim rejects the explanation that built-in jurisdictional limitations or
weak enforcement powers hindered the TRCK and eventually obstructed
the implementation of its policy recommendations.
These factors, Kim notes, could have been overcome had the TRCK
been more forward-looking and proactive in ensuring the sustainability of
its work, and had it followed the example of the Jeju Commission. In particular, it was widely predicted that the conservative Lee administration would
75. According to the findings of the Jeju Commission, the conflict resulted in an
estimated 25,000 to 30,000 deaths (corresponding to ten percent of the total population
of Jeju Province in 1947), with eighty percent of civilian deaths attributed to state
agents and thirteen percent attributed to insurgents. See id. at 132 (citing Jeju Commission Report).
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win the 2008 elections, and Lee's party's opposition to the nation's efforts
at truth-telling was well-known. Given this knowledge, Kim asserts, the
TRCK should have taken steps early on to protect its work and ensure the
full implementation of its mandate. This would have included working actively with the National Assembly to establish a permanent follow-up body
to the TRCK to take forward its work and to focus on implementation of its
recommendations. Such a body is in fact expressly provided for in the
TRCK's Framework Act, but of yet has not been created or pursued. Likewise, as it became clear that the TRCK could not complete its full investigatory work in the time statutorily proscribed, the TRCK should have
sought to amend the Framework Act so as to extend its operation. Both of
these options were pursued by the Jeju Commission and its civil society
advocates, and help to explain why its work is better known and its recommendations better implemented.
Another important step taken by the Jeju Commission, Hun Joon Kim
notes, was its executive decision to make public its data archive after its
first year of operation. By doing so, it allowed civil society and media actors to follow up with additional studies and publicity, thus increasing the
impact of the Commission's work on society at large. By contrast, the
TRCK did not make the data it relied on public, and hence its work had
much less impact on broader civil society and scholarly projects and
awareness.
The most important explanation for the difference in implementation
rates between the two commissions was nevertheless even more basic, suggests Kim. Drawing on the work of Kim Jong Min, he attributes this difference to the way each commission understood and pursued its mandate to
uncover the "truth" of the past. While the TRCK investigated the isolated
truths of individual petitions, with investigators working in isolation to construct a narrative about what happened to individual victims, the Jeju Commission made an executive decision early on to combine an individualist
"micro" approach to truth with a historically-oriented "macro" approach.
Jeju investigators thus worked together as a team to create a comprehensive
and historical truth about civilian massacres to complement the individual
truths of particular cases. It was thus able to construct a single historical
story or master narrative to tell society, whereas the TRCK was not able to
do this. The result was that the TRCK was not able to generate the same
degree of societal awarenesss and support as the Jeju Commission was able
to do.
As Kim concludes, in order to have an impact on society as a whole,
individual truth and comprehensive truth must be combined. In this regard,
a comprehensive truth does not consist of individual stories alone. Rather,
"[t]o achieve its objectives, and to have a larger impact on society, the
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TRCK should have pursued another stream of investigations to reveal the
historical and political structures that allowed past violence to perpetuate,
the political, social, and ideological contexts in which the violence took
place, and the chain of command in ordering massacres and other gross
'76
human rights violations.
In her testimonial comments, Korean War survivor Dr. Theresa Chun
likewise highlights the importance to survivors of knowing not only the
narrow forensic truth of what happened to loved ones-as important as that
is-but also the broader questions of why and how society allowed itself to
permit such atrocities to occur in the first place. 77 These macro "why" and
"how" questions are precisely those that require sustained societal examination if institutional and societal policy changes are to be identified and implemented in ways to ensure against the recurrence of gross abuses in the
future. Let us not only look backward to the operations of the TRCK, Dr.
Chun insists, but rather focus on ensuring that, both in Korea and around
the world, "other persons do not die like my brother and other families
' '78
won't be like our family and myself.
The fact that the TRCK did not pursue this broader macro set of issues-and, in its final recommendations appears to reject the need for doing
so looking forward 79-is not, however, fatal to implementation efforts. It
simply means that the process moving forward will need to be more dynamic and engaged. To facilitate that process, Hun Joon Kim focuses on the
imperative of centering particular attention on one of the TRCK's interim
policy recommendations: the creation of a permanent memorial and research foundation. Such a foundation will be able to take forward the
TRCK's work, ensuring that scholars and civil society more broadly can
continue the work of clarifying the past and working for broader recognition and justice.
In the end, then, Kim Dong-Choon and Hun Joon Kim arrive at similar
conclusions, albeit through different routes. Both underscore the importance
of foreseeing political resistance to the implementation of transitional justice work and hence the need to plan for such resistance proactively. 80 Likewise, both emphasize the imperative of active civil society engagement.
Without such engagement, political resistance and entrenched interests will
ensure that reforms are superficial if undertaken at all. Accordingly, both
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
Tale, 33

Id. at 164-65.
Chun, supra note 2, at 75.

Id.
See text accompanying infra notes 221-223 (discussing recommendation 16).
On this point, see also Erin Daly, Reparations in South Africa: A Cautionary
U.

OF MEMPHIS

L.

REV.

367, 385-87 (2003).
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conclude the need for Korean implementation efforts to focus on four key
tasks: (1) ensuring the creation of a permanent research foundation, (2)
guaranteeing the independence and accessibility of a historical data archive,
(3) promoting efforts to publicize a broad narrative truth about the nation's
past and the structural causes of violence, and (4) ensuring every opportunity for creative and expansive civil society engagement in deepening truth,
promoting locally-relevant reconciliation initiatives, and socially mobilizing
to ensure policy recommendations are fully and effectively implemented.
C. InstitutionalLegitimacy: A Focus on Fairness
These conclusions are supplemented by those of Tae-Ung Baik,81 who
uses his essay to draw attention to a different set of comparative lessons that
can and should inform the TRCK implementation process. He uses Korea's
comparative experiences with other past dealing processes to spotlight the
importance of procedural and substantive fairness in transitional justice
initiatives.
As has been argued elsewhere, whether a truth commission is effective
depends to a large extent upon two critical factors: (1) whether it is able to
attract the attention of its constituents, and (2) whether the commission is
perceived as legitimate among members of the mass public.8 2 The TRCK
has faced difficulties with respect to both of these factors. With respect to
the first, despite (or perhaps because of) its comprehensive mandate, the
TRCK has not garnered the level of attention that other transitional justice
initiatives have generated. Thus, it has been noted that its revelations, including what might otherwise have been seen as "world-shaking mega-scale
news," have been met with a lukewarm reaction in the general public, with
stories of government admissions to massacres tucked away on the inside
pages of Korean newspapers.8 3 This contrasts sharply with the experiences
of other truth commissions, such as those in South Africa, Peru, and Guatemala, which generated sustained public attention over the course of their
mandates. This difference may, in part, be due to the lack of public hearings
in the Korean context. In South Africa, special reports on the TRC were
aired every Sunday on national television, generating the highest viewer
ratings, and radio broadcasts were aired daily. By contrast, stories on the
84
TRCK, it has been noted, tended to be included only in the liberal press.
81. See Tae-Ung Baik, Fairnessin Transitional Justice Initiatives: The Case of
South Korea, 19 Bu. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 169 (2012).
82. See James L. Gibson, On Legitimacy Theory and the Effectiveness of Truth
Commissions, 72-SPG LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLS. 123, 125 (2009).
83. Hun Joon Kim, supra note 74, at 163-64 (citing commentaries).
84. See, e.g., Kim Dong-Choon, supra note 65, at 109.
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Kim Dong-Choon attributes this lack of mainstream public attention in
large part to a conservative political and media campaign to discredit or
85
undermine the legitimacy of the TRCK and other past-dealing projects.
Such a campaign, he asserts, has sought to promote the view that the TRCK
is a leftist leaning body aiming to undermine national legitimacy by making
heroes out of communists and villains out of patriots. It has also sought to
promote the view that it is time to "move forward" and forget the past, and
that the nation's numerous past-dealing projects are holding up economic
development. 86 This discourse has gained increased traction in the public
mindset, he suggests, with the onset of the economic crisis in 2005 and the
inauguration of President Lee Myung-bak in 2008. Within this context, the
concerns for justice and human rights that constituted the dominant political
discourse in the prior liberal administrations of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Muhyun were replaced by the rise of neoliberal discourse and even a "new
8' 7
authoritarianism.
Noting a similar lack of public attention to the TRCK, Hun Joon Kim
attributes this condition, as noted, to a different cause: the TRCK's failure
to articulate a comprehensive narrative about historical violence that could
capture the public's sustained attention and mobilize it to act.
In his Essay, Professor Tae-Ung Baik points to an additional possible
reason: fairness-or, better yet, the public perception of fairness. In this
regard, he underscores the importance of fairness or evenhandedness in the
work of transitional justice mechanisms for ensuring their public legitimacy. Such legitimacy is, in turn, necessary for promoting broader
processes of reconciliation throughout society at large. According to Baik,
the TRCK and other recent transitional justice mechanisms in South Korea
have paid insufficient attention to issues of fairness in transitional justice
work. This inattention, he posits, can lead to growing public skepticism
about the utility of past-dealing projects and whether they in fact constitute
a firm foundation for building a fairer and most just future. At the very
least, perceptions of unfairness in such bodies' work raise questions about
whether they are in fact contributing to the consensus-building process that
88
should serve as the basis of transitional justice work.
85. See id. at 109-10.
86. See also COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 29 (noting GNP argument
that "an obsession with the past could cause disproportionate spending and a burden
[on] the economy, sparking political dispute").
87. Kim Dong-Choon, supra note 65, at 123.
88. Legitimacy is often examined in the literature in the context of being important for enhancing citizens' voluntary compliance with institutional decision-making,
especially when they disagree with a decision taken. Credible institutions are more
likely to be persuasive and to succeed in getting citizens to accept their judgments and
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Baik provides two concrete examples of such unfairness. The first involves the monetary reparation schemes available today in South Korea for
victims of human rights abuse through the work of the TRCK and other
more specialized truth commissions. The second involves an unusual Korean property confiscation scheme pursued against those judged to be "collaborators" with Japanese colonialism. Both transitional justice
mechanisms, he concludes, could have contributed far more to societal
healing, public trust, and sustained attention to the lessons of the past had
they taken issues of substantive and procedural fairness better into account.
With respect to the former, Baik observes the vast unfairness that
reigns today with regard to individual economic reparations for past human
rights abuse. Under the present regime, access to such awards is highly
variable, dependent on which-if any-truth commission exercised jurisdiction over a victim's case. Thus, a handful of victims have received multimillion dollar awards upon their cases being recommended for retrial by the
TRCK, 89 a small minority has received administrative awards of a few thousand dollars under special incident-related compensation schemes, 90 while
the vast majority of victims have received nothing at all. This latter set
includes not only those whose cases have not been taken up by the TRCK
or any other truth commission, but also victims whose cases have been verified by specialized commissions that do not, often for political motivations,
recognize direct compensation awards. 91 Both in relation to availability and
the amounts provided, this piecemeal compensation policy may lead to resentments and frustrations, Baik argues, which may in turn threaten the
credibility and legitimacy of the truth commission project moving forward.
As an interim recommendation, the TRCK did propose the creation of
a semi-comprehensive administrative reparations program, which, in theviews. See, e.g., James L. Gibson et al., Why Do PeopleAccept Public Policies They
Oppose? Testing Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment, 58 POL. RES. Q.

187, 187 (2005).
89. Baik notes four such cases. See Baik, supra note 81, at 180-81.
90. See id. at 176-80 (discussing investigatory commissions authorized to award
monetary reparations). The quantum of awards seems to have varied significantly even
within single schemes. Compare id. at 179 (identifying average payment to those involved in the "democracy movement" as of 2010 as US$7,458) with Cho, supra note
33, at 592 (identifying average payment, as of 2006, as over US$50,000).
91. See Baik, supra note 81, at 178 (locating cause for disparity in longstanding
ideological positions and the association of certain victim groups with pro-guerrilla activities). Similar ideological issues have afflicted the reparations program in Peru. See
HAYNER, supra note 6, at 174 (describing how government's controversial final reparations program statutorily excluded members of illegal armed groups and their families
from the definition of "victim" and hence from eligibility for reparations, disregarding
truth commission's recommendation to contrary).
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ory, could help to solve this unfairness problem. 92 It was indeed in large
part precisely to avoid such unfairness and unpredictability in economic
reparation awards that President Roh Moo-hyn called for the creation of the
TRCK in the first place. That call was prompted by an administration fear
that, in the absence of a "comprehensive settlement," 93 a never ending succession of new specialized laws would ensue, with victims demanding increasingly expansive reparations packages in each. A better alternative, the
President concluded, was to pursue a single comprehensive administrative
94
policy.
Nevertheless, unlike most modern truth commissions, in recommending a semi-comprehensive administrative reparations program, the
TRCK provided no specifics whatsoever as to how that policy would be
administered or what quantum should be provided. At the same time, the
government has taken no action on such a program, nor is it expected to in
the foreseeable future. In light of this, the continuation of victim frustration
regarding compensation awards may increasingly erode the progress
achieved by the TRCK and increase public apathy to the transitional justice
project. 95 Such a fate has, by many accounts, befallen both the South African and Peruvian TRCs, each of which began with unusually high levels of
96
public legitimacy.
The second example of unfairness in Korea's transitional justice
projects examined by Professor Baik involves the work of a specialized
"truth" commission created a year after the TRCK to investigate the property of persons determined to be "serious" or "significantly pro-Japanese"
collaborators. 97 Once properties were verified as belonging to a named collaborator or descendant, that property was put in the process of conversion
to state ownership, under a statutory presumption that any properties acquired by pro-Japanese collaborators between 1904 and 1945 were "ob92. See COMPREHENSlVE REPORT, supra note 1,at 35 (limiting proposal nevertheless to compensation only for civilian massacres occurring before and during the Korean War).
93. Id. at 27.

94. See Kim Dong-Choon, supra note 65, at 99-100.
95. Cf id. at 102 (suggesting Korean victims not particularly concerned about
reparations). There is a need in this regard for better empirical and survey data on
victims' preferences and priorities regarding reparation in the Korean context. Beyond
perception studies, one important way to do this is to see how victims' rights groups
organize around the TRCK's policy recommendations and put forth their own proposals. See Melish, Truth Commission Impact, supra note 13, at 301-07.
96. See, for example, the contributions by Ereshnee Naidu and Lisa Laplante in
this special issue, infra notes 125 & 107.
97. See Baik, supra note 81, at 171 (citing mandate).
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tained as rewards for pro-Japanese acts."98 However, as Baik notes, the
procedure for doing so suffered from several important due process limitations, particularly by failing to guarantee named individuals sufficient opportunity to defend their cases in the process of investigation. These
limitations have led to vigorous court challenges under claims that the transitional justice mechanism violates the Korean Constitution itself, particularly its express protection against retroactive deprivation of property. Such
claims of unfairness in the application of general principles of human rights
to all citizens undermine the role of the investigatory body in advancing
transitional justice, Baik claims.
By contrast, the Property Redemption Commission could have contributed more to the consensus-building process of transitional justice, he argues, had it tried to enhance the procedural fairness of its work, and hence
its own legitimacy in the public eye, 99 particularly by providing for more
opportunities for participation in its investigatory proceedings. The failure
to do so, he contends, may have serious implications for the long-term effectiveness of national reconciliation efforts given the frustration these fairness concerns are likely to engender among key stakeholders. The same is
true for the opportunities such fairness concerns create for questioning the
utility and effectiveness of truth commission processes, and hence for
weakening public support of, and interest in, them.
In sum, the trilogy of articles on Korea's transitional justice experience
offer multiple insights into the implementation process and how it may be
strengthened moving forward, even while diverging in key perspectives.

III.

COMPARATIVE LESSONS FROM CROSS-NATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Given the diversity of factors that shape a country's transitional possibilities and constraints, 100 every transitional justice experience is unique.
Indeed, the choices individual societies make with respect to whether,
98. Id. at 184.
99. Procedural fairness is widely recognized as a key source of institutional legitimacy, both for truth commissions-as human rights bodies-and for other authorities
such as the police and courts. See, e.g., MARK FREEMAN, TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND
154 (2006); Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and Minority Group Members Want from the Law
and Legal Authorities?, 19 BEHAV. Sc1. & L. 215, 233 (2001).
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS

100. These factors may include the strength of groups aligned with those responsible for abuses, how vocal and organized civil society is (including victims' and rights
groups), the interest and involvement of the international community, the type and intensity of the past violence, and that "indefinable set of preferences, inclinations, beliefs
and expectations" that characterize the national political and social culture. See HAYNER, supra note 6, at 17.
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when, and how to pursue a truth commission process must necessarily follow from local priorities and assessments of what will most effectively advance justice, healing, and democratic transition. These assessments will
vary markedly across national experience. In this respect, no single experience can provide a definitive model for any other, and efforts to seek out
"blueprints" for success inevitably lead to misdirections. That said, comparative experience can provide important lessons and insights that, with care,
can be incorporated into the learning processes of other national
experiences.
In an effort to draw out some of these lessons and insights, the voices
of experts in transitional justice and TRC processes in three diverse nations-Cambodia, Peru, and South Africa-were invited to reflect on comparative national experiences with implementing truth and reconciliation
and to offer lessons for the recently-concluded TRC process in South Korea. To focus their analysis, each looks principally at a distinct aspect of
implementation: community-level reconciliation, economic reparation
packages, and memorialization initiatives.
A.

Opening Space for Civil Society Initiatives

The first of these comparative articles looks at Cambodia's experience
with transitional justice. 10 1 In it, John Cioriciari and Jaya Ramji-Nogales
examine the long history of initiatives undertaken in Cambodia to respond
to the abuses of the Khmer Rouge, culminating in the creation in 2006 of a
hybrid court to try the most senior leaders and most responsible members,
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia ("ECCC" or
"Khmer Rouge Tribunal"). As they note, Cambodia is, at first glance, an
odd case study for looking at lessons on the implementation of truth commission recommendations. Indeed, Cambodia has never had a truth commission, at least in the traditional sense, 01 2 and there are few prospects that
it will ever create one. Rather, for a variety of political motivations, it has
pursued a narrower retributive approach to past-dealing, focusing on criminal responsibility for a few top perpetrators.
Cambodia nonetheless offers important lessons for Korea. As Ciorciari
and Ramji-Nogales conclude, two primary lessons emerge from the
Cambodian experience. Both resonate strongly with the transitional circum101. John Ciorciari & Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Lessonsfrom the CambodianExperience with Truth and Reconciliation, 19 BuFF. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 193 (2012).
102. As Ciorciari and Ramji-Nogales discuss, Cambodia did nevertheless create a
truth commission-type process, the Renakse Commission, which operated from 1980 to
1983 to expose Khmer Rouge atrocities, amass evidence of damages done to people and
property, examine documents, and dig up mass graves. See id. at 200-01.
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stances in Korea. First, given how deeply intertwined power politics are
with official efforts at truth and reconciliation, the authors underscore the
importance of engaging local civil society to play a central role in truth and
reconciliation initiatives, including particularly at the design and implementation stages. This follows, argue the authors, not only from the tendency of
political elites to advance official processes that privilege narrow and constrained conceptions of "truth" and "reconciliation"-stressing dimensions
that reinforce their own power-but also because the active engagement of
local civil society in implementation initiatives generally leads to greater
responsiveness to survivors' needs and a strengthening of the deliberative
processes that lead to a more stable democratic future.
In Cambodia, as in Korea, multiple transitional justice mechanisms
have been pursued by state authorities over the last forty years. None of
these, however, has sought to foster broad revelations of truth, nor has any
sought deep grassroots reconciliation. Rather, each has been designed primarily to serve the political needs of those in power. Thus, from the 1979
"People's Revolutionary Tribunal," to the 1980 Renakse Commission, to the
2006 Khmer Rouge Tribunal, the "truth" pursued in Cambodia has tended
to be a narrow and partial one. It has, on the one hand, focused selectively
on atrocities committed during the Khmer Rouge period only, not those of
more recent abusive regimes. On the other, it has focused on a few highprofile actors for a few high-profile crimes. This approach has tended to
obscure the causes and responsibilities associated with the great majority of
abuses suffered by the Cambodian people, with the rules of evidence significantly limiting the ability to illuminate victim perspectives even with respect to these limited dimensions of truth. As a result, transitional bodies
like the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, to the extent they can be construed as truthtelling exercises, have had a very modest impact on public knowledge and
victims' healing. In particular, they have not served as a means of understanding why abuses happened or how the broader system of repression
functioned. The airing of these truths requires a different kind of mechanism or mechanisms and a different transitional justice approach.
The form of "reconciliation" pursued in Cambodia has likewise been
partial and politically-directed. It has focused on "macro-reconciliation,"
with institutional design decisions prioritizing the goals of peace and stability and political consolidation over more community-oriented and individualized processes of "micro-reconciliation" that enable former adversaries to
engage positively with one another. As a result, many survivors continue to
cite numerous barriers to reconciliation, including their inability to understand the atrocities and to know what happened. Indeed, eighty-five percent
of Cambodians today say that they would like to know more about the Pol
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Pot era. 0 3 Similar charges have been leveled against the Korean TRC,
which has been criticized for pursuing a very constrained understanding of
"truth" and an underdeveloped concept of "reconciliation."
And yet, such limitations in official efforts at truth and reconciliation
should not necessarily lead to cynicism, conclude Ciorciari and RamjiNogales. The second lesson from Cambodia, they stress, is the importance
of seizing the perhaps unexpected benefits that can be derived from particular institutional sequences in transitional justice efforts. Thus even transitional justice mechanisms that are not aimed primarily at promoting broad
truth and deep reconciliation may create the political space necessary for
individual citizens and civil society organizations to take forward other important and innovative truth and reconciliation measures or processes. Such
a lesson resonates deeply in South Korea, a nation in which multiple transitional justice projects have been pursued over the last several decades, with
each opening important political spaces for the next generation of efforts.
In Cambodia, the authors observe, non-governmental groups have
taken advantage of the political space opened by the EEEC to become the
unofficial implementing agencies of many of the kinds of measures recommended by the Korean TRC, often working together in creative partnerships
with the government. While many of these initiatives have taken place at
the grassroots level, some, the authors note, have translated into key national policy programs. Thus, the non-governmental Cambodian Documentation Center (DC-CAM) has, with authority from the government,
established an extensive publically available archive of accessible documents on Khmer Rouge history that is available for researchers and the
public at large. Since 2008, DC-CAM has likewise undertaken a major nationwide project with the Ministry of Education to reform school curricula
and to train teachers to better address Khmer Rouge history at the secondary and university levels. It has likewise sought to promote deeper and
more enduring community-level reconciliation processes by engaging
Cambodians at the village level through structured dialogues on the ECCC
trials and losses suffered at the hands of the Khmer Rouge.
It is the seizing of such spaces by civil society groups, stress Ciorciari
and Ramji-Nogales, that provides hope for pursuing comprehensive and dynamic understandings of the past and deep grassroots reconciliation, even
where this has not been the primary aim of official processes. It is particularly important, they stress, "in societies in which political gridlock slows
progress at the official level and draws initiatives into partisan debates,"'04 a
characteristic that could just as easily describe national politics in South
103. See id. at 213.
104. Id. at 216.
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Korea. The ability of civil society to rise above such gridlock and to have
an enduring impact on community-level processes derives in large part
from such groups' non-partisan mandates, their ability to tap into local cultural and religious norms, and their relative dynamism and ability to adapt
quickly to varying political conditions and group sensibilities. They can, in
this way, penetrate more deeply into community processes of coming to
terms with the past and reconciling former adversaries, something which
national level authorities can rarely, if ever, do on their own.
The example of the non-governmental organization DC-CAM is again
highlighted in this regard, particularly in its efforts to promote structured
community dialogues across the nation. These dialogues not only raise
awareness of, and enhance the legitimacy of, national processes, such as the
ECCC, that may otherwise remain inaccessible and irrelevant to local communities (and in any case are not expressly directed to exposing a broad
truth or at achieving reconciliation). They also move beyond official efforts
to promote creative community ownership over their own diverse processes
of truth-telling and reconciliation. 105 They thus serve to empower Cambodians themselves to structure a healing process that is most appropriate to
address their unique needs.
The authors stress, in this regard, three interrelated facets of local reconciliation processes that have been particularly important in Cambodia.
The first is the importance of building "safe spaces," neutral, non-political
fora for truth-telling that involves genuine dialogue between survivors and
perpetrators. Such spaces should not only be participant-designed and
driven, stress the authors, but also inclusive of all societal groups, including
perpetrators. In this way, dialogue can humanize complex historical conflicts, allowing multiple stories to be told and promoting a deeper understanding of the many conflicting motivations and frailties that compel
individual and group conduct in diverse situations. By complicating and
humanizing conflict-in ways that may often conflict with official "national reconciliation" goals-communities can thereby help to avoid the political imposition of monolithic narratives or labels that may serve
(intentionally or unintentionally) to perpetuate or even accentuate divisions
within communities, leading to further violence in the future. Such fora can,
correspondingly, contribute to a more comprehensive and accurate historical picture, better capable of answering the critical question "Why?"
105. For a similar perspective on local efforts at dialogue, truth-telling, and community self-healing in Guatemala, see Laura Arriaza & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Social
Repair at the Local Level: The Case of Guatemala, in

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FROM

BELOW: GRASSROOTS ACTIVISM AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CHANGE

& Loma McGregor eds., 2008).

143 (Kieran McEvoy

2012]

Implementing Truth & Reconciliation

The two other facets stressed for the Cambodian context include the
engagement of civic and religious leaders in such community dialogues.
This follows from their ability to ensure that dialogues are tailored to local
sensibilities and therefore more effective as reconciliation processes. Second, the authors stress the value of neutral, non-political public memorials
and ceremonies, such as a monument to the departed or a national day of
remembrance. According to the authors, these have been most conducive to
healing in the Cambodian context when focused on sharing communal suffering and honoring loved ones, rather than focusing enmity on perpetrators
and their kin.
These lessons are particularly compelling for South Korea, where it
has been argued that the TRCK has pursued a particularly limited notion of
both "truth" and "reconciliation." As described by Hun Joon Kim and other
Korean scholars, the truth pursued by the TRCK and other past dealing
projects has been a selective one. Likewise, there has been little work done
to truly understand what is necessary for deep reconciliation, both at the
national and community levels, and for understanding the structural and
ideological causes of violence such that preventative reforms can be put in
place.
The Cambodian experience thus reinforces the conclusion that the
TRCK cannot be seen as an end product. Rather, it is merely the jumping
off point for a much longer and more dynamic process of constructing the
"truth," reconciling communities with one another, and promoting deep institutional reforms. As Kim Dong-Choon notes, civil society actors in South
Korea are already beginning such efforts. 10 6 But a much larger national effort is necessary, with support and appropriate orchestration from above.
B.

Implementing Economic Reparation Packages

Lisa Laplante107 follows with an Article that echoes many of the
broader themes highlighted by Ciorciari and Ramji-Nogales, including the
importance of both civil society participation and attention to communitylevel needs. Her contribution nonetheless focuses concretely on the process
of quantifying individual economic reparation awards as part of a comprehensive program of reparations. This issue is of particular relevance to the
Korean experience given the TRCK's explicit interim recommendation for
the government to create a special law on victim reparations, a recommendation that the government has to date chosen to ignore. 08 The govern106. See Kim Dong-Choon, supra note 65, at 124.
107. Lisa Laplante, Negotiating Reparation Rights: The Symbolic and Participatory Quotients, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 217 (2012).
108. See Kim Dong-Choon, supra note 65, at 117.
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ment's position has instead been to continue a piecemeal, politicized
approach to individual economic reparations; an approach that, Tae-Ung
Baik observes, threatens to increase popular disillusionment given the exceptional unfairness it creates across victim groups. The Peruvian experience with a similar lack of government will to implement a comprehensive
reparations program, and the unfair set of packages it has endorsed for different political groups, may thus be particularly instructive for the Korean
implementation process looking forward.
In her article, Laplante explores the complicated problem of how to
determine an appropriate quantum for administrative reparation programs, a
determination that has caused difficulties at the implementation stage in
many reparations processes.10 9 These difficulties arise in particular from the
inevitable tension that exists between civil tort and administrative approaches to reparations."l 0 Indeed, because administrative reparations
schemes, which tend to define victims in standardized terms and provide a
relatively fixed, tabulated amount of compensation for all, will almost always grant an award significantly lower in quantum than what a given victim could expect through individual litigation"l-a conundrum clearly
borne out in the Korean examplell 2-there is always a risk that victim and
survivor groups will reject administrative reparation awards administered
by the state. This, argues Laplante, has been the case in Peru.
For Laplante, the government might have safeguarded against the rejection of its recent individual economic reparations proposals by better incorporating two critical elements into its program. She calls these the
"participatory quotient" and "symbolic quotient." The "participatory quotient" refers to the right of civil society to participate, through ongoing consultation and negotiation, in the process of determining an appropriate
109. See, in particular, THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS (Pablo de Grief ed.,
2006) (offering multiple examples in national case studies).
110. See Jaime E. Malamud-Goti & Lucas Sebastiin Grosman, Reparationsand
Civil Litigation: Compensationfor Human Rights Violations in TransitionalDemocracies, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra, at 539 (describing differences in two
approaches).
111. See, e.g., Pablo de Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF
REPARATIONS, supra note 109, at 451 (attributing this largely to fact that "all legal
systems work on the assumption that norm-breaking behavior is more or less exceptional," whereas administrative reparations schemes respond to massive and systematic
violations); id. at 456-57 (noting that had Peru provided reparation awards to all victims
comparable to those ordered by the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human
Rights, it would have exceeded its entire national budget for 2003).
112. See Baik, supra note 81, at 171-72, 176-83 (underscoring inequities between
multi-million dollar compensatory settlements awarded through the Korean courts and
administrative reparations schemes offering victims a few thousand dollars each).
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quantum. Such a process, Laplante argues, has two critical effects-a legitimating effect and a democracy-building, reparative effect. The first draws
on a substantial body of work addressing why citizens comply with decisions that conflict with their immediate interests. That is, citizens are more
likely to accept a smaller quantum if they feel genuinely listened to and
considered in the technical calculation. Participation in this sense promotes
beneficiary buy-in and policy compromise, Laplante asserts.
At the same time, participation in decision-making can itself serve as a
form of reparation, especially in transitional societies in which victim
groups have long been denied citizen-status through extensive social, political, and economic marginalization. In such contexts, the act of being consulted can serve to restore citizen-status, providing at times the first
experience of a positive interaction with the government and creating institutional channels of democratic inclusion for groups historically marginalized and disempowered in society. By treating the formerly marginalized as
equal citizens under the law, the citizen-building aspect of the participatory
quotient can, in this way, serve to create what Pablo de Grief refers to as
"external coherence" in reparations programs, linking economic awards to
democratic institutional reforms, and strengthening citizens' sense of own113
ership of those democratic reforms.
Second, the Peruvian government should have ensured an appropriate
"symbolic quotient" in its economic reparations program by reflecting state
acknowledgment of and assumption of responsibility for the harm it
caused. 14 Money alone is not enough, Laplante contends; to fulfill their
true reparative effect, reparations awards must be accompanied by symbolic
acts of contrition, such as public statements by officials that both explicitly
recognize the government's legal responsibility for rights violations and
make the link explicit between that responsibility and the reparations payments. It is indeed through the process of recognition, Laplante argues, that
economic reparations create a reparative effect. Without this symbolic aspect, victim groups are likely to question and even reject economic measures, which they might confuse with development assistance or see as a
new form of misrecognition. 115 Japan's unwillingness to admit guilt regarding its use of Korean comfort women during World War II has, for instance,
been said to "depreciate the economic value of the compensation it offered

113. Pablo de Greiff, Repairing the Past: Compensationfor Victims of Human
Rights Violations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 109, at 1, 11.
114. See Laplante, supra note 107, at 219, 233.

115. Id. at 235-36.
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and made it valueless."' 16At the same time, where an apologetic stance is
tied together with money, it can create greater micro effects with less
money.
In the case of Peru, the government failed to ensure either of these
critical quotients. Indeed, despite one of the most participatory processes of
any truth commission in history in terms of drafting a highly detailed proposal for economic reparations, the government has not only failed to follow the plan, but has denied civil society participation in the design of the
program it has proposed instead. It has underscored in this regard that reparations are a "unilateral" decision of the state. As a result, Laplante observes, organized Peruvian civil society groups have protested the plan,
understanding it as instantiating new forms of dignitary harm that exacerbate their marginalization from democratic processes."17 In her piece on
South Africa, Ereshnee Naidu notes a similar process in South Africa.
There, too, the government has ignored the TRC's recommendation for economic reparations, providing an amount four times less that proposed by the
TRC and insisting that the determination is the exclusive prerogative of the
state. Indeed, civil society groups in South Africa had to sue the govern-

116. Id. at 235 (citing ELAZAR

THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITUTION
352 (2000)). Although the Japanese government long denied that the Korean, Chinese, Filipino, Dutch, and other women held in
"comfort stations" for Japanese soldiers during the war were in fact coerced into providing sexual services, the coerced nature of the sexual slavery was finally recognized in
1993, and a formal apology was issued. See James Sterngold, Japan Admits Army
Forced Women Into War Brothels, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 1993). Disquietingly, twenty
years later, Japan's new prime minister, Shinzo Abe, nonetheless signaled his intent to
retract that apology as part of an effort to rewrite Japan's wartime history, stating that
his previous administration had found no evidence that the women who served as sex
slaves to Japan's wartime military had, in fact, been coerced. See Editorial, Another
Attempt to Deny Japan'sHistory, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2013).
117. Part of this anger may come from the plan's failure to differentiate between
rural and urban constituencies, many of whom experienced the conflict differently and
have different social needs. See, e.g., ICTJ & APRODEH, Perd: gCudnto se ha
reparadoen nuestras comunidades? (2011), available at <http://www.ictj.org/sites/defaultlfiles/ICTJ-Peru-Reparaciones-2011-Espa%C3%B1ol.pdf> (concluding that communities which have received collective reparation are largely satisfied with the
programs implemented to date, even if they do not find them sufficient compensation
for the harms incurred). Collective reparations, which have thus far been implemented
in 1,492 Peruvian communities severely affected by past violence, "include irrigation
infrastructure and the provision of drinking water and proper drainage, livestock
projects, the construction and expansion of schools, and the construction of community
centers." Id.
BARKAN,

AND NEGOTIATING HISTORICAL INJUSTICES
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ment under their Freedom of Information Act even to get access to the
government's draft reparation policy." 8
At the same time, the symbolic quotient has been denied in each of
these contexts, likewise contributing to victim rejection. In the case of Peru,
this has been done particularly by government attempts to link its reparation
program not to government responsibility for its own human rights abuses,
but rather to compensation for those who suffered "as a result of terrorism." 119 As Laplante notes, by disassociating reparations from state responsibility and understanding them instead as a mere gesture of help for those
unfortunate enough to be negatively impacted by terrorism, the symbolic
importance of acknowledgment was immediately lost.120 The same has been
true in South Africa, albeit resulting from the long delay in the processing
of reparations payments and hence their disconnection from the testimony
given at the TRC. These delays have been characterized as the most damaging aspect of the TRC's work, 12 1 and, as has been observed, reduced "'the
symbolic sense of the reparation,' thus "often doing more harm than
22
good." 1
The process in Korea forebodes similar problems, both with respect to
the participatory and symbolic quotients. Thus, not only did the TRCK fail
to make any specific recommendations with respect to the quantum or mode
of distribution for individual economic reparations, but it likewise failed to
recognize any direct participatory role of victim-survivor groups in negotiating an appropriate amount of compensation (Laplante's "participatory
quotient"). This is true even while the TRCK recognizes in broadly abstract
terms the important symbolic aspect of providing such reparation; such provision, it notes, would "indicate recognition of the illegal acts committed by
the state in the past, acceptence of responsibility, and achievement of social
justice."'1 23 It would also end the state practice of justifying failure to provide reparations on account of procedural hurdles, which only "deepens"

118.
Africa, in
119.
120.
121.

See Christopher J. Colvin, Overview of the Reparations Program in South
THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 109, at 176, 202-203.
Laplante, supra note 107, at 246.
Id.
See Wendy Orr, ReparationDelayed is HealingRetarded,in LOOKING BACK,

REACHING FORWARD: REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

SOUTH AFRICA 239, 242-43 (Charles Villa-Vicencio & Wilhelm Verwoerd eds.,
2000) [hereinafter LOOKING BACK].
122. Yazir Henry, Where HealingBegins, in LOOKING BACK, supra, at 166, 172.
123. TRCK Final Recommendations, supra note 11, at 82.
OF
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the anguish of bereaved families. 124 In this context, the fact that the TRCK
made no concrete recommendations with respect to a comprehensive reparations regime that would in fact fulfill this "symbolic quotient" is deeply
concerning, as is the lack of any legislative or executive follow-up in creating such a program.
C.

MemorializationInitiatives

Ereshnee Naidu 25 tells a similar story about reparations implementation in South Africa, a nation that-despite its storied fame and broad promotion as a successful model for comparative borrowing-has shown a
similar lack of will to implement individual reparations packages. This lack
of will at the stage of implementation has led to deep disillusionment with
the TRC process, a sense of revictimization on the part of many victimsurvivors, and growing sentiment that the TRC was pursued only as a political project to appease the international community.
In discussing the implementation process in South Africa, Naidu looks
at a variety of measures, including individual economic and community
reparations. She nonetheless focuses on one particular type of reparations:
memorialization initiatives. As a form of symbolic reparation, memorialization includes such measures as building monuments, museums or other
commemorative projects, renaming streets, parks, public facilities or
squares, or designating special days in memory of past events or people.
She focuses in particular on the establishment in South Africa of Freedom
Park, an interactive memorial site for honoring and remembering those who
fought against apartheid.
Such projects, Naidu explains, can contribute to important ends of reparative justice, including processes of reconciliation, healing, victim recognition, and guarantees of non-repetition. Nonetheless, they can just as
easily lead to contestations and divisions, fueling ongoing feelings of victimization, and may even become a fault line for violence. This is especially
so, Naidu asserts, if not adequately complemented by other reparations
processes and supported by broader socio-economic transformation, as the
South African case demonstrates. Borrowing on de Grieff's concept of "external coherence," she thus suggests that memorialization initiatives can be
meaningful only if linked to other forms of reparations and part of a comprehensive package that includes compensation, rehabilitation, and in124. Id. This dignitary justification is offered in conjunction with the institutional
rationale of preventing social conflict and the "decline of national power due to separate
lawsuits and legislation." Id. at 83.
125. Ereshnee Naidu, Symbolic Reparations and Reconciliation: Lessons from
South Africa, 13 BuFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 251 (2012).
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creased access to health services and community reparation. These linkages,
she insists, must be taken into consideration in implementing any comprehensive reparations program.
To illustrate this thesis, Naidu uses the Freedom Park Memorial Project to examine some of the challenges faced in South Africa in implementing the TRC's symbolic reparations recommendations. For Naidu, these
challenges include "questions of how the past should be remembered, who
should be remembered, and what to do with memorials that may not neces' 126
sarily reflect the values of the new democracy and broader citizenship."
The Freedom Park Memorial Project has struggled with all of these challenges. In particular, it has struggled with the difficult choices that inevitably have to be made in seeking to accommodate two equally important but
often competing objectives of reparative justice: the need to promote national reconciliation and unity, on the one hand, and to recognize the suffering of victims and to honor those whose lives were lost or irremediably
changed in the fight against abusive state power, on the other.1 27 The former
implies an emphasis on inclusiveness, advancing a coherent narrative that
can represent all citizens within a transition, and tends to cloak divisions of
the past. The latter, by contrast, necessitates a certain exclusiveness. The
honoring of those who fought on one side of a civil conflict functions in
practice, in this regard, to define an ideological boundary between insiders
and outsiders. That boundary may deepen past divisions or extend resentments between former adversaries and the social groups with which they
align.
Such has been the case with Freedom Park, Naidu asserts, which has
exposed significant fault-lines in the nation's quest for racial reconciliation.
As South Africa's first major memorialization project that has utilized the
language of symbolic reparation in its mission, Freedom Park aims "to celebrate all South Africans that struggled for freedom and humanity."' 128 It is
constituted by a memorial, an interactive museum, and a garden of remembrance, all situated on a hill directly opposite a pre-existing heritage site,
the Voortrekker Monument, an icon of Afrikaaner nationalism. This carefully designed juxtaposition had a purpose: it aimed to advance a national
126. Id. at 265.
127. Correspondingly, in recommending a program of symbolic reparations, the
Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee of the TRC emphasized the role of such
measures in restoring the dignity of victims and "facilitat[ing] the communal processes
of commemorating pain and celebrating the victories of the past." Id. at 264 (citing
TRC Report). Such honoring serves the goals of individual (and often group) reconciliation, but underscores the trade-offs that often have to be made in terms of reconciliation
at the national, community, and individual levels.
128. id. at 265.
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dialogue about the past and present. Recognizing that important segments
of the citizenry may still have a symbolic stake in the major iconography of
the nation's Apartheid past, it sought to reinterpret, rather than replace, that
iconography. Nevertheless, in mediating the difficult tensions between inclusiveness and exclusiveness, a decision was made that the Garden of Remembrance's commemorative wall would include the names of only
"liberation-aligned soldiers" who died during the struggle for freedom from
Apartheid. The names of former state-aligned SADF soldiers would be excluded. Designed to honor and celebrate only one side of the conflict, this
exclusion prompted immediate public outcry. Stressing the need for a reevaluation of the roles and contributions of SADF soldiers, local Africaansled organizations argued that the soldiers' exclusion represented their
marginalization in the new South Africa, rather than their acceptance as part
of an inclusive society.
The Freedom Park management offered a minor responsive concession: It agreed to include the names of SADF soldiers in its database and
archives. It nonetheless refused to include them in the Garden of Remembrance. It justified this on the ground that the wall of names is "a symbolic
reparations program," which is "about recognition and honoring, and not
' 29
necessarilyabout reconciliation."'
Because Apartheid was a crime against
humanity, management stressed, the exclusion of the names of those who
fought in its name was justified. In light of this refusal, the Voortrekker
Monument management responded by providing its own space for a monument of names of all SADF soldiers. Although an access road was officially
created between the two monuments as a symbol of goodwill between the
vying institutions, the dispute over names underscores, Naidu argues, the
continuing racial tensions in South Africa and the practical difficulties in
accommodating the competing goals of recognition and reconciliation.
What lessons does this teach? In highlighting the current surfacing of
longstanding racial tensions around symbolic reparations projects in postApartheid South Africa, Naidu links them to several failures on the part of
the TRC. In particular, she attributes them to the TRC's failure to confront
directly issues of racial reconciliation and the structural inequalities between blacks and whites that defined Apartheid. This failure was in many
ways built into the TRC's mandate and the reconciliation discourse intrinsic
to it. It manifested in the narrow statutory mandate given to the TRC to
investigate only the limited physical integrity violations associated with direct political conflict between state agents and political activists. The mandate thus excluded attention in many ways to the structural inequalities
between blacks and whites that have made it difficult for the majority of
129. Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
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South Africans to move on from the past. 130 At the same time, it manifested
in the TRC's reluctance to directly address issues of race and racism in
clarifying the truth of the past. Indeed, as Naidu stresses, the TRC's enabling legislation is in fact devoid of specific reference to either "apartheid"
or "racism." The TRC thus failed to make connections between the human
rights violations it was investigating and the racialized power relations in
which they took place. This failure, Naidu notes, has substantially diminished the relevance of the TRC and its work to the daily lives of ordinary
black South Africans. This diminished relevance has significantly hampered
its potential for contributing to transformation and reconciliation. Indeed,
it serves as a major cause of the continuing difficulties in the credibility and
legitimacy of implementation efforts.
Naidu thus calls attention to the way the limitations in a truth commission's mandate and the reconciliation discourse intrinsic to it can lead to
difficulties at the stage of implementation. Recognition of these limitations
points to potential lessons for other transitional experiences. Indeed, in
South Africa, Naidu stresses, such limitations have resulted in some of the
major challenges the nation faces today with regard to issues of transformation, reconciliation, and the realization of an equitable democracy.
These limitations and their impact on the implementation process bear
important lessons for South Korea and its implementation process. Indeed,
while the South Korean context does not include the same kinds of racialized violence as South Africa (or other states like Guatemala), the underlying causes of human rights abuse in South Korea have a parallel structural
root: the Cold War-inspired ideological conflict promoting anti-communism
as a total justification for human rights abuse. Indeed, as the contributions
to this Issue make clear, anticommunist ideology and the chilling silence it
long imposed in South Korea not only remain a powerful social constraint
on public recognition of the past, but continue to justify human rights violations in South Korea today. The TRCK nonetheless avoided tackling this
underlying structural cause directly, preferring to adopt a "forensic" approach that individualized truth discovery and failed to provide a broader
narrative about the systems and ideologies that allowed abuse to occur in
the first place. This failure will inevitably diminish the TRCK's relevance
to the daily lives of ordinary Koreans and hence, as Kim and Baik observe,
its longer-term legitimacy as an effective mechanism of transitional justice.

130. See in particularMadeleine Fullard, Dis-placing Race: The South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and Interpretationsof Violence, in RACE
AND CITIZENSHIP IN TRANSITION SERIES

docs/racism/displacingrace.pdf.

(2004), available at http://www.csvr.org.za/
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Naidu's contribution thus underscores the importance of further efforts
in South Korea aimed at clarifying the broader narrative about the structural
and ideological causes of violence throughout contemporary history. Critically, this includes a clear narrative about how those causes continue to
manifest in present times. This narrative is particularly essential to ensuring
the implementation of institutional reforms that can modify the policies and
practices that have long justified state abuse in the name of national security. Such policies and practices often remain stubbornly in place, raising the
ever present possibility of their continuing abuse.
IV.

A TRILOGY OF TRCK RECOMMENDATIONS

What, then, do these multiple lessons hold for South Korea's implementation process moving forward? Before addressing some of these global

lessons more specifically in Part V, I return below to a more detailed consideration of the TRCK's actual policy recommendations: what did the
TRCK produce and why? The nature of these recommendations speaks
volumes to, and provides essential context for, the integrated strategies that
will need to be adopted to ensure that the TRCK's recommendations and
broader policy goals are effectively realized moving forward.
Under the Framework Act, the TRCK was expressly mandated to use
its truth investigations to prepare two sets of reports for submission to the
President and the National Assembly. The first was a semi-annual "investigation report" detailing its ongoing activities. The second was a "comprehensive report" to be submitted within six months of the expiry of its
investigations,13' and to include recommendations for state remedial measures.1 32 In interpreting these provisions, the TRCK took certain important
liberties. In particular, through a "liberal" reading of the Act, the TRCK
interpreted its authority as allowing it to issue three distinct kinds of recommendations: case-specific recommendations issued at the time of case verification; interim recommendations issued in its ongoing activities reports;
and final "integrated" recommendations to be included in the TRCK's final
comprehensive report.
The chronological sequencing of these recommendations responds in
large part to the evolving national political context. As both Kim DongChoon and Hun Joon Kim underscore, the span of time in which a truth
commission operates means that political changes may predictably occur
over its life time that introduce or institutionalize attempts to frustrate the
goals and functionality of a truth commission. In the Korean context, such
131. See Framework Act, supra note 4, art. 32(1)-(2).
132. See id. art. 32(4).
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a change occurred in early 2008, two years into the TRCK's investigatory
operations. That year brought back to power the conservative GNP party,
known for its general hostility to the TRCK and other past-dealing
projects. 133 The TRCK responded by asserting its power to issue two sets of
pre-final report recommendations. These included case-specific recommendations and more globally-oriented interim recommendations. The following sections describe the three distinct sets of recommendations more
closely. The strengths and limitations of each, as well as their internal inconsistencies, will need to be closely attended by a range of stakeholders as
they seek to develop forward-looking strategies for the full and effective
implementation of the TRCK's three sets of recommendations.
A.

Case-Specific Recommendations

The first set of recommended remedial measures issued by the TRCK
took the form of case-specific recommendations. Having received over
11,000 petitions for investigation by December 2006, the TRCK made an
important decision in 2007. Not only would it issue decision notes on each
investigated petition in which the underlying incidents could be verified, as
required under the Framework Act, 134 but it would transmit that note to the
National Assembly and President with an accompanying set of recommendations for remedial measures to be taken with respect to it. Such remedial
measures, the TRCK reasoned, could fall into any of the categories of reparation specified in the Framework Act for inclusion in the comprehensive
report. 135 Their timely release was necessary, it submitted, to avoid the "delay [in implementation that] can undermine the effectiveness of the recom-

133. The elections followed a decade of liberal party rule, during which time transitional justice initiatives received express state support.
134. See Framework Act, supra note 4, art. 26.
135. See id. art. 32(4). The power to issue these recommendations and the state's
corresponding obligation to implement them, the TRCK reasoned, followed from the
Framework Act's broad articulation of the duties of the state and Commission, particularly in Chapter 4. See COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 1,at 35 (interpreting article
32 and Chapter 4 references to the reconciliatory measures for the state and commission
to take). These provisions specified not only a set of state implementation duties, but
also a series of specific kinds of recommendations the Commission could make with
respect to victims and perpetrators, each suggesting an ability to make recommendations with respect to individual cases. These included investigation-specific damages,
pardons or exonerations for those wrongly convicted or sanctioned, immunity or mitigation of punishment for perpetrators who confess, and apologies and forgiveness between specific perpetrators and victims. See Framework Act, supra note 4, arts. 34, 3639.
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mendations" should they be held until the release of the comprehensive
1 36
report.
Although this interpretation of the TRCK's powers was controversial
at the time, the liberal Roh Moo-hyun government responded decisively to
it as a last act of office. 137 In January 2008, just a month before being replaced by the conservative Lee Myung-bak government, President Roh executed Presidential Decree No. 20532, Regulations on Processing
Recommendations Related to Past Affairs, by creating a high-level interagency system for implementing the petition-specific recommendations
submitted to it by the TRCK. Initially framed as a Recommendations Follow-up Board, 138 this system was designed to officially recognize the recommendations and fast-track their interagency implementation.
The Follow-up Board was correspondingly comprised of three bodies:
a Review Committee, a Working Committee and a Taskforce, all comprised
of inter-agency officials operating through the Ministry of Public Administration and Security. 139 These three bodies were to work with the Commission to create and supervise action plans with respect to the execution of all
TRCK recommended measures associated with decision notes, including
those directed to specific government agencies. 140 The result of this system
is that a massive number of recommendations have been transmitted to the
government since 2008. Indeed, as of mid-2010, the TRCK had made petition-specific recommendations in 8,691 cases-that is, in all cases duly verified with accompanying decision notes. 14' These included 885 agency136. THREE YEAR REPORT, supra note 4, at 32. This lesson had, of course, already
been learned in other nations, such as South Africa. See text accompanying supra notes
121-122.
137. Whether read positively or cynically, the decision as a last act of office represents a shrewd political move to make sure the incoming administration would be held
immediately accountable for its record on implementing the TRCK's recommendations.
138. See THREE YEAR REPORT, supra note 4, at 32-33. The TRCK's final report,
by contrast, refers to it as the Review Committee for the Execution of Recommendations on Past Affairs. See COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 196.
139. Compare THREE YEAR REPORT, supranote 4, at 32-33 with COMPREHENSIVE
REPORT, supranote 1, at 196-198. This system was originally installed under the Office
of the Prime Minister, but was moved with the inauguration of President Lee a month
after its creation as part of a government organizational reform.
140. See THREE YEAR REPORT, supra note 4, at 33; COMPREHENSIVE REPORT,
supra note 1, at 196 ("A review committee was installed to review the recommended
steps and to make sure related agencies execute the recommendations.").
141. See COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 199. The Commission received 11,174 cases based on petitions from individuals. The body confirmed 8,468
cases (76%), rejected 1,729, and sent another 957 cases to other instances or closed
them because of insufficient information. Of the confirmed cases, the vast majority

2012]

Implementing Truth & Reconciliation

specific recommendations made in 289 cases, mostly directed to the Minis42
try of National Defense and the National Police Agency.
Nevertheless, despite the delay-reducing intentions that prompted
them, the TRCK's case-specific recommendations exhibit several key features that impose important challenges for their effective uptake and implementation. The first is the extreme generality of their framing and the
inaccessibility to the public of their programmatic details. Indeed, the specific contents of the recommendations are not laid out systematically in the
final report;143 they are referenced by broad strokes only, their descriptions
corresponding to the general categories in the Framework Act.' 44 Moreover,
even where summaries of "main verified cases" are included, they tend to
confirm that case-specific recommendations are issued at a very high-degree of generality. 145 Such generality can significantly complicate individual efforts to seek follow-through on petition-specific recommendations,
accentuating the need for collective action in monitoring and implementation and the enactment of comprehensive legislation. While the final report
does include a set of tables that breakdown certain case-related recommendations into remedial categories and show the status of their implementation, the results are limited to the small subset of cases in which

(7,099) involved Korean War related civilian mass killings. A surprisingly small number (258) involved human rights violations during the authoritarian regimes. At the
same time, 1,331 involved "anti-ROK elements" while a negligible one and two cases,
respectively, involved anti-Japanese independence movements and the history of overseas Koreans. See id.
142. See id. at 200. As of the first half of 2010, implementation was complete in
only eight of these cases, or 2.8 percent. Id.
143. This is true despite the TRCK's 2009 affirmation of its "responsibility" to
"indicat[e] and document[ I the recommendations for each truth verification in a comprehensive report." THREE YEAR REPORT, supra note 4, at 112.
144. See COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 199 ("The recommendations
[in petition-specific cases] mainly involve state measures to reinstate the honor of victims, government measures to prevent recurrences; corrections and revisions of related
laws, systems, policies and practices; government efforts for national reconciliation and
democracy; and education and advocacy efforts to encourage correct understandings of
history."). Similarly broad and unspecific descriptions are made in other parts of the
Final Report. See also THREE YEAR REPORT, supra note 4, at 107 (similar generality in
description).
145. See, e.g., THREE YEAR REPORT, supra note 4, at 70-81, 86-101 (describing
main verified cases involving "massacres" and "human rights abuses," respectively).
Although not translated into English, "summaries of the results of investigations" are
included in Volumes 2 through 4 of the TRCK's Comprehensive Report. See COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
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recommendations were directed to specific government agencies. 146 The nature and implementation status of the remaining ninety-seven percent of
cases are not tracked.
Other critical information about petition-specific recommendations is
likewise missing from the final report. This includes whether individual petitioners were directly and timely informed of the recommendations associated with their petitions and, perhaps most importantly, whether any
mechanism exists within the inter-agency implementation system for directly involving petitioners or other concerned stakeholders in the monitoring and implementation process. The absence of information to this effect
147
would suggest that no such mechanism exists.
Without these mechanisms for facilitating stakeholder participation
many of the potential advantages of a petition-specific approach, it would
seem, are effectively surrendered. The effect may be reflected in the implementation rate, which, by the TRCK's admission, remains uncomfortably
low. By the end of the commission's mandate, implementation was complete in only eight of the 289 cases in which case-specific recommendations
were made to discrete government agencies. 148 Of these, most of the recommendations had been directed to the Ministry of National Defense and the
National Police Agency, and involved simple official apologies and memorial activities. Perhaps more disturbingly, implementation rates in human
rights abuse cases for compensation, relief programs, and government apol-

146. See COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 199-204 (showing status of
implementation by government agency, by type of recommendation, and by type of
incident). The Commission's three year "Activities Report" summarizes the 1,679 recommendations made as of September 30, 2008. With regard to the 1,461 cases involving civilian massacres, the Commission recommended "official state apologies, revision
of family registers, memorial events, additions or revisions regarding historical records,
peace and human rights education, revision of related laws, and medical subsidies for
the wounded." THREE YEAR REPORT, supra note 4, at 32. In the 162 cases involving
"groups opposing the legitimacy of the ROK," it recommended a similar set of measures. Id. at 32-33. There were only fifty-six cases involving human rights abuses. Of
these, the commission recommended an official state apology and retrial in the thirtyfive cases involving irrevocable court rulings. In the seventeen related to illegal arrest,
detention, and death, it recommended an official state apology, medical services, deletion of records, and damage reparation. Finally, with regard to the disqualification of
national bar exam students who participated in demonstrations, it recommended government apology and nullification of the disqualification. See id. at 33.
147. See THREE YEAR REPORT, supra note 4, at 33 (schematic showing follow-up
structure and noting opening in Working-level Committee exclusively for TRCK members to participate and speak).
148. See COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 200 (less than 2.8%).
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ogies were, according to the TRCK's final report, "extremely low. ' 149 Kim
Dong-Choon likewise notes this suboptimal implementation record in his
150
contribution.
B.

Interim Policy Recommendations

Attuned to the effects of national political changes and with likely
growing awareness of the limits of the case-specific approach, the TRCK
issued three major "interim" policy recommendations to the government in
mid-2009. 15 1 Proposed by a more politically liberal and pro-TRCK commission than the one that replaced it in late 2009,152 these included a special
compensation law for victims of mass civilian killings, the establishment of
a permanent research foundation, and the continuation of burial and excavation projects. These recommendations had the benefit of consolidating the
thousands of otherwise identical case-specific recommendations into three
major policy initiatives that could be pursued by organized society and victim groups as a whole.
Descriptions of these three policy recommendations are included in the
TRCK's 2010 comprehensive report.15 3 Nevertheless, while the language
used appears to endorse them in fairly strong terms, it is of note that they
are neither structurally nor substantively integrated into the TRCK's "final
recommendations." Rather, they are set off in a separate, preliminary chapter that likewise includes examples of recommendations issued by other
domestic truth commissions in South Korea and a set of foreign truth commissions.1 54 This placement, and the corresponding lack of integration into
the TRCK's own final set of recommendations, raises questions about the
2010 TRCK and Korean government's understanding of their status, both
legally and politically. Such questions are underscored by the TRCK's reference to the interim measures as policy "suggestions" or "proposals"
149. Id. at 203.
150. See Kim Dong-Choon, supra note 65, at 113.
151. See COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 35 (noting recommendations

made in August and October of 2009).
152. In late 2009, TRCK President Aln Byung-Ook was replaced by the more
conservative Lee Young-jo, known for his view that the TRCK is not cost-effective or
productive and should be shut down. At the same time, "[a]dvocates say the commission is being shuttered because current President Lee Myung-bak and his conservative
ruling party are uncomfortable with the scrutiny of the country's past." See, e.g., Ashley
Rowland & Hwang Hae-Rym, Time is Running Out on South Korea's Truth andReconciliation Commission, STARS & STRIPES, Jan. 19, 2010.
153. TRCK Final Recommendations, supra note 11, at 81-84.
154. Id. at 79-81.
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(konui) rather than plenary "recommendations" (kwanggo), 55 and the direct
recognition that it drafted its own final recommendations in light of others
(both domestic and foreign) in order that they be "more objective and prac156
tically possible."'
1.

Special Law on Victim Reparation

The first interim policy recommendation proposed the enactment of a
special law on reparations for victims of civilian massacres in the period
immediately preceding and during the Korean War. The necessity of such
legislation derived from three factors: the massive number of petitioned
cases involving such massacres (over 80 percent of the cases in which rec58
7
ommendations were made), 5 the active lobbying of bereaved families,
and, perhaps most importantly, the lack of any common standard or methodology for determining appropriate compensation in the thousands of casespecific recommendations calling for victim indemnification, honoring, and
other forms of reparation. Because such case-specific recommendations
were crafted without specifying any particular quantum of compensation,
package of relief, or mechanism for distribution, it was difficult to see how
they could be implemented individually on a fair and efficient basis without
a special law establishing principled grounds for determining such questions. The absence of such a law and other procedural hurdles had indeed
provided a continuing justification for the state to drag its feet in providing
victim reparation, thereby undermining the Commission's very justification
for initially issuing case-specific recommendations. 1 9
The TRCK thus called for a special law that would embrace the "earnest demand" of bereaved families "with fairness and a consistent standard."' 6 That standard, said the commission, should be anchored in the
"scope and extent of the damage" actually endured and be based on "current
living conditions."' 6 1 It should, however, be provided as a "specially fixed
155. I am indebted to Mark Nathan for this point of translation.
156. TRCK FinalRecommendations, supra note 11, at 78.
157. See COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 82, 199 (noting verification of
7,992 petitions related to civilian massacres by government-aligned forces during war
years, and fact that recommendations were made in 7,099 of these-of 8,691 total cases
in which recommendations were made).
158. The Pan-National Committee on Verifying Massacres and the National Committee of the Bereaved Families of Korean War Victims, in particular, have long been
active in demanding a final and complete resolution of the civilian massacres issue.
159. See text accompanying supra note 136.
160. TRCK FinalRecommendations, supra note 11, at 82.
161. Id.
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amount of consolation money."' 62 The TRCK thus appeared to embrace a
comprehensive administrative approach to victim reparation, rather than an
individualized methodology. 163 It stressed in this regard the value of such an
approach not only in its symbolic reparatory sense "for accomplishing reconciliation and for preventing social conflict," but also for avoiding the "decline of national power" that would result from "separate lawsuits and
' 64

legislation." 1

The TRCK nonetheless did not go further in developing a concrete
proposal or set of proposals as to any specific quantum that should be provided. Nor did it specify how that quantum should be determined, whether
it would be fixed across all categories of injury, or how it would be dispersed to identified beneficiaries, as has usefully been done by many recent
truth commissions.1 65 As Lisa Laplante underscores in her contribution on
Peru, such determinations and their negotiation with victim-survivor groups
constitutes one of the most fraught and contested, albeit important, issues in
66
truth commission practice.1
Special attention will correspondingly need to be directed to these critical reparation issues in the post-TRCK implementation period. Given
South Korea's own recent experience with incident-specific special compensation laws-as highlighted in Tae-Ung Baik's contribution 67-special
attention will likewise need to be directed to the scope of this recommendation, and whether it should appropriately be broadened to include all classes
of victims, not only those from the Korean War era. Other nations that
initially pursued narrow reparation plans have indeed seen the need to expand them to equalize benefits across victim groups. The experiences of
Argentina and Chile may be especially instructive to South Korea in this
68
regard.1
162. Id.
163. See Malamud-Goti & Grosman, supra note 110, at 540 (describing two
approaches).
164. TRCK Final Recommendations, supra note 11, at 83.
165. Consider the detailed proposals in this regard by countries such as South
Africa and Peru. See Colvin, supra note 118; Lisa Magarrell, Reparationsfor Massive
or WidespreadHuman Rights Violations: Sorting Out Claimsfor Reparationsand the
Strugglefor Social Justice, 22 WINDSOR Y.B. OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 85 (2003).
166. Laplante, supra note 107. At the very least, a detailed Commission proposal
can be used by advocates as leverage and a negotiating baseline in pushing the government to enact a just and comprehensive reparations law.
167. Baik, supra note 81, at 176-83.
168. See, e.g., Marfa Jos6 Guembe, Economic Reparationsfor Grave Human
Rights Violations: The Argentinian Experience, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS,
supra note 109, at 21; Elizabeth Lira, The ReparationsPolicyfor Human Rights Viola-

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

2.

[Vol. 19

Permanent Research Foundation

The TRCK's second interim policy recommendation recognized forthrightly that the TRCK would leave a great deal of critical work unfinished
at its scheduled expiry. It correspondingly called upon the government to
set up a permanent foundation to continue research on past affairs. Such
research would include investigations not only into incidents considered but
unverified by the TRCK, but also into new petitions from the tens of
thousands of victims who had not submitted petitions within the TRCK's
one-year submissions window. In addition to research, the permanent foundation would likewise serve as a permanent archive for documents and
records related to the past, as well as sponsor or support ongoing memorial
projects, cultural activities, and exhumations. 169 The TRCK thus recognized
that the work of uncovering truth and promoting reconciliation could not
take place in "one fell Swoop. ' 170 Rather, it would need to proceed "step by
step," with a plurality of overlapping measures needing to be taken by many
distinct actors over time.' 7 ' Serving as the "brightest shining achievement"
of what Korean society has done to date in terms of settling historical affairs, a permanent research foundation would correspondingly allow such
172
measures to develop on a continuing basis.
Significantly, such a foundation was already contemplated by the
drafters of the Framework Act. That Act provided that the state "may fund"
the establishment of a research foundation for past incidents, which would
operate and manage a "memorial business and historic materials center"
and whose independence would be "guaranteed."' 173 In issuing a targeted
policy recommendation to implement this provision, the TRCK thus presumptively sought to remove the government's ability to invoke the Act's
discretionary language, converting it into a government duty under the
mandatory "shall" provisions of the Act's provisos regarding the TRCK's
74
recommendations.
tions in Chile, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 109, at 55; HAYNER,
supra note 6, at 167-71.
169. See TRCK Final Recommendations, supra note 11, at 84.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Framework Act, supra note 4, art. 40 (emphasis added).
174. Id. art. 32(5). While the Framework Act's mandatory language recognizes
that there may be circumstances in which a particular recommendation could not be
implemented, it nonetheless requires that the government "shall... attempt to implement" any recommendation proposed to it. Id. (emphasis added). This language should,
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The need for such an implementation hook may have seemed particularly urgent for two reasons. On the one hand, as Kim Dong-Choon observes, with the onset of the economic crisis, conservative calls for shutting
down all truth commission work and ceasing to focus on uncovering incidents of the past were gaining force on the ground that they were harming
the nation's economy and international standing. 175 There was thus little
likelihood that the TRCK's mandate would be extended. On the other, as
Hun Joon Kim notes, the creation of a similar research foundation with
respect to the unfinished work of the Jeju 4.3 Commission had proved decisive in accounting not only for its higher level of public attention and support, but also, critically, for the higher rate of implementation of its final
76
recommendations. 1
3.

Excavation and Burial Projects

The third interim policy recommendation, by contrast, spotlighted one
discrete area of work that would remain unfinished at the TRCK's expiry:
exhumations of massacre sites and reburial of victim remains. Indeed, while
the TRCK had presided over the successful exhumation of over 1,500 bodies, large numbers of known massacre sites remained untouched and many
unearthed bodies remained temporarily housed in university research cen177
ters in need of proper burial.
The TRCK thus called upon the government to promote exhumation
and reburial projects for civilian victims of massacres as "a long-term government policy.'1 7 Toward this end, it recommended the enactment of a
special law relating to exhumations that would contribute to the efficient
implementation of "government-led" policies designed to ensure "permanent burials" for victim remains. 79 Such a policy, it was recognized, was
essential for healing historical wounds and comforting the pain of bereaved
families. 180
As with individual victim reparation and pursuit of permanent measures of truth and reconciliation, the interim recommendation on exhumations thereby recognized the implementation limits of a case-specific
approach. It correspondingly sought comprehensive framing legislation to
in effect, be read as a "show cause" provision, requiring that any decision not to implement a recommendation be affirmatively explained by public authorities.
175. See Kim Dong-Choon, supra note 65, at 108-10.
176. See Hun Joon Kim, supra note 74, at 161-63.
177. TRCK FinalRecommendations, supra note 11, at 83.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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provide a firmer basis for individuals and organized society to press for
implementation of the TRCK's victim redress recommendations.
C.

Final Policy Recommendations

The third set of recommendations issued by the TRCK-its "final" or
"integrated" recommendations-is the only set recognized expressly in the
Framework Act. Those recommendations were issued in December 2010
by a Commission notable for the political shift that had taken place in its
membership from only a year earlier. It was nonetheless this particularly
constituted Commission that would consolidate the body's investigatory
findings and conclusions over four and a half years and prepare its final
recommendations for state remedial measures. Ultimately, it agreed upon
and presented a mere seventeen policy recommendations in its final report.
As noted, these seventeen recommendations are noteworthy in three
particular respects: their high level of generality and lack of programmatic
detail; the lack of substantive integration between the petition-specific, interim, and final recommendations; and the tensions or inconsistencies they
exhibit with respect to the final recommendations of certain more specialized truth commissions operating concurrently in South Korea. All three of
these considerations will need to be closely attended by advocates and other
stakeholders in the implementation process. The following sections discuss
each final recommendation, organizing them-as the final report doesunder seven headings corresponding to the respective remedial categories
181
specified in the Framework Act.
1. Victim Honor and Relief
The first four of the Commission's seventeen final recommendations
are organized under the heading "Measures for Restoring Honor and Providing Relief for Victims. 18 2 They are notable in several respects. Perhaps
most importantly, by adopting a highly individualized and substantively
narrow approach to victim reparation, they appear to be in tension with the
comprehensive approach endorsed by the Commission's interim recommendations. Recommendation 1, for example, focuses on the reparatory power
181. See text accompanying supra note 61. Although the Framework Act specifies
eight broad types of state remedial measures, the TRCK organizes its recommendations
into seven chapters, apparently integrating "State measures to account for an unverified
investigation result to its victim and sufferer" into "Other measures that the Commission deems necessary to achieve the purpose of this Act." TRCK FinalRecommendations, supra note 11, at 94-95.
182. TRCK FinalRecommendations, supra note 11, at 84-87.
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of truth in restoring victim honor, focusing on the social "stigma" effect of
being called a rebel or spy (rather than acknowledgment of state atrocities
committed against millions of Koreans). It thus calls upon the state to
"mak[e] widely known the truth" about individually verified incidents "that
are not well known," suggesting that doing so is sufficient to "respect" the
TRCK's case-specific recommendations.183 No reference is made to the
need for either a comprehensive or even a special law on reparations. Indeed, no mention is made of the need for any monetary compensation at all,
nor any type of reparation beyond TRCK verification of the facts of a case,
even though the TRCK's case-specific recommendations suggested a far
broader range of remedial measures to be taken by the state to repair individual victims.
The vagueness of the recommendation thus leaves unanswered the important policy questions raised by earlier recommendations, especially related to the appropriate reparation package and compensation quantum for
distinct victims, how they should be determined, and what the administrative distribution mechanism should look like. These questions will require
sustained attention by victims and broader civil society in the post-TRCK
implementation process, both to ensure actual implementation of victim redress and to avoid extending the current inequities in existing incident-specific reparation laws and in the results of individual litigation.
Recommendation 2 is similarly limited in scope. It calls expressly for
state provision of medical treatment and psychological counseling to vic84
tims of both civilian massacres and more recent human rights abuses.' It
nonetheless does not specify how this should be done, nor does it provide
any other programmatic detail. Finding "precedent" for the provision of
medical treatment in earlier specialized acts, 85 it stops short of calling for
comprehensive legislation. It likewise fails to recognize the need for any
other form of reparation, including money awards, despite substantial domestic (and foreign) precedent, 186 and the explicit inclusion of such broader

183. Id. at 84-85.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 85-86 (citing special laws on victims of the Jeju 4.3 and No Gun Ri
incidents, respectively, both of which specify the provision of medical treatment).
186. For more on the kinds and quantum of reparation provided to victims of
distinct historical incidents in the Korean context, see Baik, supra note 81, at 176-80.
As just one example, the Review Committee for Restoring the Honor and Compensating Persons Involved in the Democratization Movement had issued $28.7 million in
compensation to 543 persons involved in the democratization movements by December
28, 2008. See Cho, supra note 33, at 592. For an excellent resource on foreign precedent, see HANDBOOK ON REPARATION, supra note 109.
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reparation in both the case-specific and interim recommendations. 8 7 As one
of the richest nations in the world, South Korea cannot claim resource limits
as a justification for the prioritization of non-monetary forms of reparation.
Again, civil society and victim groups will need to organize actively to
ensure appropriate legislation that includes all aspects of reparation for all
victim groups.
While recommendations I and 2 focus on reparation for abuses committed by the Korean state, recommendations 3 and 4 turn to reparation for
incidents involving foreign nations. Specifically, they call upon the Korean
government to engage in diplomatic efforts with the United States and Japan, with a view to ensuring that those governments provide appropriate
reparation to victims. In this respect, they suggest the need for the United
States to enact special legislation establishing reparation for victims of U.S.
military incidents and for Japan to grant special permanent residency status
to those denied it as a result of the "Korean-Japanese spy incidents."1 88
Advocates might question why these four measures are dealt with separately, rather than calling for a comprehensive reparation law that deals
with all of them. Indeed, Korea's experience with the unfairness of special
incident-related reparation laws would seem to counsel in favor of a comprehensive approach. Likewise, the experience of other nations would tend
to suggest that such a comprehensive approach would best serve not only
the dignitary and psychological needs of victims, but also the administrative
and financial interests of the state in ensuring timely and efficient closure to
the massive number of reparation demands legitimately made upon it. 189 As
the TRCK recognizes in its own final report, it was indeed in part to promote such a comprehensive approach that the TRCK was pursued in the
first place. 190
2.

Preventing Recurrence

The TRCK's final report recognizes "preventing the recurrence of past
atrocities" as a-if not the-primary purpose behind the body's establishment.' 9' It is thus astonishing that it includes only a single, exceedingly
circumscribed recommendation under the associated chapter heading. Recommendation 5 calls upon the state to "devise institutional mechanisms for
187. See, e.g., TRCK Final Recommendations, supra note 11, at 82.

188.
American
pensation
189.

Id. at 86-87 (citing as precedent the "Act to Indemnify Damages Caused by
Forces Abroad," adopted by the United States during WWI to provide comand reparation for injured French civilians).
See, e.g., Malamud-Goti & Grosman, supra note 110.
190. COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 27.
191. TRCK FinalRecommendations, supra note 11, at 78.
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the punishment of perpetrators of mass killings ...
War."

surrounding the Korean

192

Advocates may be forgiven for reading this recommendation with a
measure of cynicism. This is not only for the narrow retributive approach
taken to prevention, but also for the proposed measure's practical obsolescence: The war having ended over sixty years ago, few if any such perpetrators remain available for prosecution.193 The war-focus of the
recommendation, moreover, conspicuously excludes attention to the perpetrators of the more recent human rights abuses occurring under Korea's
authoritarian regimes, especially under the National Security and AntiCommunist Acts. For these punishing laws, statutes of limitation often remain stubbornly in place. In this regard, the TRCK's reference to a 1995
special act recognizing the non-applicability of statutes of limitations for
certain mass killings only accentuates its failure to recommend the removal
of statutes of limitations for other state-sponsored human rights abuses, a
recommendation that was made by the Presidential Commission on Suspicious Deaths in 2002, and again in 2004, as part of its recommendations for
194
preventing the recurrence of suspicious deaths.
3.

Reforming Laws, Institutions, Policies and Practices

The narrowness of the above "prevention" measure may partially be
attributable to the Framework Act's inclusion of a separate remedial category on "[m]atters relating to the alteration, abolition, and rectification of
laws, institutions, policies and customs/practices."1 95 The importance of
such legal, institutional and policy reforms for preventing the recurrence of
past atrocities is indeed recognized by the TRCK forthrightly in its final
report. Thus, the "main reason" for civilian massacres and human rights
violation in times of emergency is attributed directly by the TRCK to "the
deficiencies in the policies and practices of state institutions with respect to
' 96
basic human rights and humanitarian law protections."'
Given the clarity of this conclusion, the narrowness of recommendations 6 through 8 is striking. Recommendation 6, for example, does not call
for the abolition or even amendment of the notorious National Security Act,
192. Id. at 87.
193. This constraint, it has been noted, in fact constituted a major reason for pursuing a truth commission rather than a more retributive approach in the first place. See
Kim Dong-Choon, supra note 65, at 101.
194. TRCK FinalRecommendations, supra note 11, at 79-80 (noting such recommendations were "not accepted" or "not implemented").
195. Id. at 78.
196. COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 1.
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which criminalizes core free speech and association rights and has long
been used to justify highly repressive state conduct. It instead calls merely
upon the state to "use caution" when applying it, given the "risk of misuse
and abuse" it carries. 197 The Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious
Deaths, by contrast, called in its 2002 and 2004 reports for the express
abolition not only of the National Security Act, but also the Security Surveillance Act and the Protective Custody System, as well as the Research
198
Institute of Public Safety Affairs and the Democracy Research Institute.
National and international human rights groups have been calling for the
same ever since. 199
Recommendation 7 likewise calls on the state simply to "minimize restrictions on basic rights" 200 during national emergencies, including in such
areas as preventive custody, residency restrictions, and freezing assets. Suggesting that laws identified as giving rise to severe human rights abuses do
not necessarily need to be changed, the Commission recommends that the
state merely "prepare institutional plans" for use during national emergencies. 20 1 This is done even as the TRCK recognizes the very real possibility
of a renewed state of emergency given the unstable peace that exists with
North Korea on account of the 1953 armistice. 20 2 The effect of such a recommendation is thus largely to legitimize past restrictions of rights in the
name of national security. Faced with similar abuses, other national truth
commissions have taken a different approach, unambiguously denouncing
the use of "national security" rationales to restrict the civil liberties of citi203
zens in wartime.
197. TRCK Final Recommendations, supra note 11, at 88.

198. Id. at 78-80, tbl. 8-1.
199. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, THE NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, supranote 55, at 4
("The abuse of vaguely worded clauses in the NSL [National Security Law], especially
Article 7,has caused such concern that UN human rights mechanisms, domestic human
rights bodies like the National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK), Am-

nesty International and other national and international human rights organizations have

all urged the South Korean government to fundamentally review or abolish the NSL.");
id. at 4,20 (calling on the government of South Korea and 2012 presidential candidates
to "[a]bolish or substantially amend the [National Security Law] in line with the country's international human rights obligations and commitments").
200. TRCK FinalRecommendations, supra note 11, at 89 (emphasis added).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 89-90.
203. See, e.g., Eric K. Yamamoto & Liann Ebesugawa, Report on Redress: The
JapaneseAmerican Internment, in THE HANDBOOK ON REPARATIONS, supra note 109,

at 257 (highlighting creation of fund to educate U.S. public about the government's
false assertion of national security to restrict the civil liberties of Japanese Americans
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Recommendation 8 is similarly constrained in its remedial scope. Referring to the need to declassify certain documents relating to the past that
have been designated as secret on national security grounds, it nevertheless
calls vaguely on the state to make public those documents only "after a
fixed period of time." 204 It likewise calls not for specific reforms to current
laws and procedures for the declassification of secret documents, but rather
for their mere "supplementation." No programmatic suggestions are offered
as to what such supplementation would look like, nor on what the appropriate criteria should be for the release of documents. Civil society will need to
take these issues up directly as part of the implementation process.
Recommendations 9 and 10 are more targeted and hence more instrumentally useful. Recommendation 9 calls specifically on the state to amend
the Family Registry Law to allow people to correct information concerning
family members' deaths in the official registry without incurring financial
penalties. 20 5 Recommendation 10, for its part, recommends that the state
find ways to improve the reliability of the autopsy system. 20 6 Such improvements would include requiring that autopsies be conducted by medical professionals (not investigative agents, as so often led to cover-ups in the past),
expanding financial support, and revising the Criminal Procedure Code and
20 7
other relevant laws.
4.

Victim Reconciliation with Perpetrators

Predicated on the oddly simplistic view that "[r]econciliation is accomplished when perpetrators first confess and apologize, and then victims forgive the perpetrators, '20 8 recommendation 11 asserts simply that "[t]he state
must go further in actively supporting institutional mechanisms for realizing
reconciliation by means of perpetrators repenting and victims or their families forgiving. ' 20 9 It provides no detail as to what such institutional mechaduring WWII). The Civil Liberties Act of 1988 likewise directed the President to apologize for the internment and authorized over $1 billion in reparations. See id.
204. TRCK Final Recommendations, supra note 11, at 90.
205. Id. at 90-91.
206. Id. at 91.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 92 (emphasis added). For interesting essays on the psychology of victims' sense of repair and reconciliation, see Brandon Hamber, Narrowing the Micro and
Macro: A Psychological Perspective on Reparationsin Societies in Transition,in The

Handbook of Reparations, supra note 109, at 560; M. Brinton Lykes & Marcie Mersky,
Reparations and Mental Health: Psychosocial Interventions Towards Healing, Human
Agency, and Rethreading Social Realties, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra
note 109, at 589.
209. TRCK FinalRecommendations, supra note 11, at 92 (emphasis added).
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nisms might look like. Nor does it specify what kind of "active support"
21 0
would be necessary in this regard.
5.

National Reconciliation and Democracy Enhancement

Turning to national-level reconciliation and democratic development,
recommendations 12 through 14 refer to measures of symbolic reparation,
such as apologies and memorialization. Recommendation 12 thus calls for a
direct apology by the state to victims and their families for the illegal abuse
of power. While noting an official presidential apology in 2008 for a set of
prominent massacres, it underscores the necessity of state apology for all
verified incidents as a way to heal national wounds and promote national
211
unity.
Recommendations 13 and 14 focus on distinct types of memorialization. Recommendation 13 calls on the state to find "proper burial places"
for the remains of victims of mass killings and to "build reconciliation and
memorial facilities.1 2 12 The latter facilities would be formed as a "symbol
of national reconciliation" by promoting a "comprehensive understanding"
of incidents involving both state agents and "hostile" parties. 213 They would
also serve as a "ground for national education about security, human rights
and peace. '214 Similarly, recommendation 14 calls for state support of local
joint memorial services and monuments in which communities work to re21 5
member those killed by both sides of the ideological conflict.
Significantly, as with recommendations 1 through 4, these recommendations nonetheless call into question the TRCK's understanding of the relevance of the body's own interim policy recommendations. This is
especially so as many of the activities specified would be covered comprehensively by the work of the Permanent Research Foundation and by the
proposed law on exhumations and reburials, neither of which the TRCK's
21 6
final recommendations specifically endorse.

210. It states merely that "courageous confessions" should be promoted through
"supportive plans at an institutional level for fostering an environment of reconciliation." Id.
211. See id. at 92-93.
212. Id. at 93.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See discussion infra at 61-62.
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Human Rights Education and Historical Consciousness

Recommendation 15 serves as an important, if unrefined, education
catch-all. It calls on the state to implement educational and promotional
activities and to develop educational materials as a way of fostering respect
for life, peace and human rights. 217 This is necessary, it asserts, as a way to
both express "the state's willingness to make efforts to prevent a reoccurrence" of gross human rights violations and to foster "a climate that values
human rights. '218 No detail, however, is offered as to what kinds of promotional materials or education services should be pursued, nor why these
would be most conducive to healing in the Korean context. The absence of
specific recommendations with respect to publicity and education around
even the TRCK's own final report is noteworthy, especially in light of the
state's failure to publicize and make it widely available.
7.

Other Necessary Measures

Finally, recommendations 16 and 17 are offered as "other measures the
commission deems necessary to achieve the purposes of [the Framework]
Act. ' 219 Both refer to continuing efforts at research and historical clarification. In so doing, they suggest similar purposes as the Permanent Research
Foundation without, notably, in fact calling for the creation of one. Recommendation 17 thus appeals to the state to endeavor to get evidence from the
United States or other countries about incidents involving the U.S. military
around the time of the Korean War. 220 Similarly, recommendation 16 calls
on the government to "prepare policies" for persons who might have claims
but who did not have the opportunity to apply to the TRCK, and to "support
22 1
academic research" into incidents that were not investigated.
Significantly, in calling for research into additional incidents, the report nonetheless indicates that such research should focus on verifying "mi'222
croscopic truths," not on shedding further light on "macroscopic facts.
By contrast, TRCK watchers have tended to conclude precisely the opposite: that the TRCK's narrow investigative methodology and focus on forensic truth allowed it to do a relatively good job at exposing the former,
while failing to create a broader, more comprehensive "macro" narrative
that would allow for a true understanding of the deep structural and institu217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

TRCK FinalRecommendations, supra note 11, at 94.
Id.
Id. at 94-95.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 95.
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tional causes of past abuse. 223 Investigation and clarification of such causes
is a key part of truth commission work, as Naidu's contribution underscores. And it is indeed to remedy such causes that truth commission recommendations are directed. The TRCK's narrow focus on forensic "micro"
truths has in this sense been said to obscure the reforms that must take place
to prevent further violence and human rights abuse.
D.

Toward Effective Implementation

What is to be taken from these recommendations? From the perspective of promoting effective implementation, two major conclusions might
be drawn. Each responds to one or more of the three highlighted traits char224
acterizing the TRCK's recommendations.
1. Using Generality to One's Advantage
The first observation relates to the lack of programmatic detail in the
Commission's recommendations. Such generality can serve in many cases
to impede effective implementation: as has been noted, "broadly sweeping
recommendations are difficult to implement, awkward as an advocacy tool,
and hard to measure in terms of implementation.

'225

As a result, truth com-

missions that have provided very specific suggestions have generally been
more likely to see success. Indeed, a high level of specificity makes it far
more difficult for public officials to ignore policy recommendations. This is
particularly because it enhances the ability of national and international
stakeholders to use truth commission recommendations as tools of publicity, leverage, and even aid conditionality for promoting politically difficult
but necessary institutional and policy reforms. 226 At the same time, it creates an important baseline in negotiations, requiring that public authorities
expressly justify departures from policy specifics in terms that resonate
with the truth commission's express goals of victim repair, national reconciliation, and prevention-focused reform. It is perhaps for this reason that
the TRCK in 2009 underscored, as part of its "further agendas," the "ur223. See, for example, Kim Dong-Choon and Hun Joon Kim's contributions to
this special issue, supra notes 65 & 74.
224. See text accompanying supra notes 63-64 (generality, lack of substantive
integration, and internal inconsistencies).

225.

HAYNER,

supra note 6, at 193.

226. Id. at 191, 193 (noting role of international community in pressing Salvadoran authorities to implement truth commission recommendations and advocating linking
international assistance with implementation of domestic truth commission recommendations); Kritz, supra note 8, at 18 (likewise advocating tying donor aid to improved
implementation of truth commission recommendations).
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gent" need for the Commission to provide "well planned methodologies"
for achieving each of its broad ends, including "by instituting applicable
regulations or laws and by securing the necessary finance and procurement
227
measures."
On the other hand, generality provides space for civil society to take an
active role in filling in the details of necessary measures in ways that are
most responsive to local needs. Such space may be particularly important
where truth commissions fail to actively consult with civil society and victim groups regarding the final content of its recommendations-as the
TRCK failed to do (even as it recognized such consultations as an international best practice).2 2 8 For such a benefit to accrue, however, a strong political commitment to stakeholder participation in the implementation and
follow-up process must exist. The fact that no mechanism for promoting
stakeholder participation appears to exist in the follow-up structure created
to implement the TRCK's recommendations does not bode well for
implementation.
Given these considerations, organized victim and civil society groups
will need to pay close attention to the processes established for implementing the TRCK's recommendations, insisting on active participation not only
in the follow-up process, but also, just as critically, in the design elements
of policy implementation. Where such structured participation does not occur, the prospects of effective implementation of the TRCK's recommendations are decidedly limited.
2.

Resolving Inconsistencies

The second major observation relates to the lack of clarity in governmental duties that results from the tensions and inconsistencies in the various sets of truth commission recommendations. 229 How are such
inconsistencies to be resolved? Are any set of recommendations to take
priority? These questions will inevitably take center stage in the implementation process, with many likely arguing that the TRCK's final recommendations should take priority over other sets of truth commission
227. THREE YEAR REPORT, supra note 44, at 111-112.
228. TRCK Final Recommendations, supra note 11, at 78 ("[Tjhe Commission,
due to a lack of time, missed the process of holding public hearings and getting professional advice [on the content of its comprehensive recommendations], as other foreign
truth commissions have done during the drafting of their recommendations.").
229. As described above, these include the TRCK's victim-specific recommendations, interim recommendations, and final recommendations, as well as the multiple
recommendations issued in the final reports of other more specialized truth commissions operating in South Korea over a similar period of time.
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recommendations, even as the former may often provide less protection to
victim rights of redress.
In addressing these questions, victim advocates would do well to adopt
the principled position that all recommendations are of equal legal and political weight, with a corresponding government obligation to implement
each of them, absent a showing that a specific measure cannot be implemented. 230 As such, all efforts should be made to read the recommendations
consistently. Where such reading is not possible, the pro homine principle
should be employed to resolve any resulting inconsistency. That principle,
foundational to the international law of human rights, requires that norms
be interpreted and applied in a way that most fully and adequately protects
human beings. 231 Correspondingly, where two recommendations are in tension, the one that is most favorable to the individual human being and protective of human dignity should prevail.
To ensure the application of this interpretive principle, civil society
advocates and monitors will need to remain highly vigilant and engaged in
implementation work. In particular, they will need to embark on a careful
mapping of all recommendations, pinpointing points of convergence and
divergence, and creating an action plan to ensure all inconsistencies are
resolved in favor of the more protective principle.

V.

GLOBAL LESSONS?

The contributions to this Special Issue have raised a kaleidoscope of
considerations to be taken into account as the Korean people move forward
toward implementation. Some of these relate to how the TRCK process
could have been structured differently from the start. These lessons are important to acknowledge, even if we cannot go back and do things differently, and even if it is unlikely that another official truth commission will
be created in the Korean context. Indeed, recognition of these limitations
can help us to understand how processes need to be structured moving forward to fill in the gaps created by the TRCK process. If the follow-up process is structured responsively, what appear as weaknesses may indeed turn
out to be unexpected strengths.

230. Framework Act, supra note 4, art. 34; see also id. art. 32(5) ("The related
entities receiving any recommendation under paragraph 4 shall respect and attempt to
implement the proposed recommendations.") (emphasis added).
231. H. VICTOR CONDE , A HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TERMINOLOGY 114 (1999); 19 Tradesmen v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (2004) Series C, No. 109, 173; A. Azocar v. Chile, Inter-Am. Comm.
H.R. (1999), Report No. 137/99, Case 11,863, 146.
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More of the lessons offered, however, speak to what must be done
prospectively to ensure implementation of the TRCK's recommendations
now that they have been issued and its mandate has come to a close. The
Korean political context does not, at present, appear particularly hospitable
to this end. As Kim Dong-Choon and Hun Joon Kim note, the vast majority
of recommendations issued by the TRCK remain unimplemented. There is,
moreover, little evidence of any political will to move forward with their
implementation. Within this context, a comprehensive strategic plan must
be pursued by civil society groups to alter the calculus and conversation
surrounding implementation.
The sections below aim to consolidate five of the most important (or at
least instrumental) of the lessons suggested by the contributions to this Special Issue. They include the priority need for active civil society engagement in the implementation process, the creation of permanent follow-up
and orchestration bodies, the pursuit of truth as a dynamic and ongoing
project, data independence and accessibility, and, finally, the use of measurable indicators for holding government and other key stakeholders to
account.
A.

Civil Society Engagement and Creative Implementation
Entrepreneurship

Perhaps the clearest lesson that comes through from this Special Issue's contributions relates to the essential role played by domestic civil society in ensuring that truth commission recommendations are in fact
implemented in practice. Around the world, the implementation record for
truth commission recommendations is indeed abysmal. 232 The reason is
fairly straightforward: It is, simply, not in the interests of most politicians to
bother with the costly and complex measures of implementation once the
international spotlight directed at formal truth commission operations dims.
Arguing that "we've done that," and it is "time to move on," most will
undertake a few inexpensive measures or token gestures and then move on,
insisting that economic recovery or putting an end to violent crime takes
precedence.
A key role of civil society actors in the implementation process is thus
to alter the incentive structure associated with truth commission recommendations follow-up work, finding ways to construct, monitor, and police an
accountability framework in which concrete responsibilities can be distributed among stakeholders, who can then be held answerable for following
through on their commitments. By tracking what distinct social stakehold232. See text accompanying supra notes 7-10.
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ers are doing (or not doing), enhancing public awareness of the range of
activities underway, and assessing best and worst practices, civil society
networks may contribute in vital ways to enhancing accountability for poor
performance, stimulating new processes and partnerships, and keeping a
spotlight focused on implementation over the longer-term. Indeed, without
an active public pressing for specific and targeted action, and demanding a
key role in the process of carrying it out, little in the way of implementation
should be expected.
Civil society actors likewise play an indispensable role in ensuring that
truth commission follow-up measures (from reparations programs, to memorialization projects, to legislative reforms) are designed and implemented
in ways that are in fact responsive to community needs, preferences, and
priorities. It is important to underscore in this regard that implementation is
not a responsibility of government alone. While certain recommendations
will require action that only the political branches can take-and it is of
course public officials that commit under law to implementing truth commission recommendations 233-many other recommendations will relate to
activities that may most profitably be pursued by civil society actors, either
in partnership with local officials or independently. In this respect, civil
society actors have a responsibility to step in and become what Ciorciari
and Ramji-Nogales refer to as the "unofficial implementing agencies" of
truth commission recommendations.2 3 4 It is indeed such local actors who

generally have the greatest contact with and trust of local communities.
They are thus well positioned to design creative, place-based initiatives that
draw on community resources and are directly rooted in local experience.
By mapping the recommendations of truth commissions, as well as the
range of social stakeholders that can and should take part in their implementation, civil society actors can thus play an indispensable role in ensuring that multi-layered and mutually-reinforcing processes are in place to
help deepen and contextualize reform efforts. In so doing, they can help to
unleash the creative energy and entrepreneurship of multiple actors, with
potentially important feedback, learning, and scaling effects for other implementation partnerships and follow-up initiatives.

233. But see Tara J. Melish, Maximum Feasible Participationof the Poor: New
Governance, New Accountability, and a 21st Century War on the Sources of Poverty,
13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 79-83 (2010) (discussing detailed follow-up commitments to South African Poverty Hearings made by individuals throughout civil society, including in the media, religious institutions, business sector, NGOs, and the public
more broadly).
234. Ciorciari & Ramji-Nogales, supra note 101, at 194.
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Permanent Follow-up and OrchestrationMechanisms

A second key lesson relates to the importance of institutionalizing permanent follow-up and orchestration mechanisms within government to ensure high-level engagement with, and participatory implementation of, truth
commission recommendations. In South Korea, a Recommendations Follow-Up Board (or "Review Committee") consisting of high-level interagency officials was in fact created in the early stages of the TRCK's work.
Its operation has nonetheless proved largely ineffectual. This outcome owes
in large measure to the system's lack of built-in accountability mechanisms,
including transparency guarantees, public reporting requirements, and victim participation. Indeed, victims have little to no ability to influence or
understand the body's decisions, even where their own case-specific measures are at issue.
Evidence suggests that implementation focal points within government
will be effective to the extent that spaces or tools are created through which
civil society actors can interact with, partner, and leverage their work, including at the design, implementation, and monitoring stages of follow-on
activities. Examples include requirements that such bodies publish semiannual activity and progress reports that are widely accessible to the public,
that they entertain and hold public hearings as solicited by distinct civil
society groups, that they consult broadly on the scope and design of programs, and that they issue express public justifications for decision-making,
especially where it departs from truth commission recommendations. Effective implementation of such recommendations will indeed always involve
complex processes that require deep levels of consultation, careful balancing of interests and resources, a high degree of planning, and deep responsiveness and adaptability to local circumstances and needs. As such, an
inter-agency government focal point must have the power not only to make
programmatic and budgetary decisions on implementation matters, but also
to ensure stable institutional spaces for feedback from, and coordination
with, those most affected.
The creation of a functionally-independent monitoring and protection
mechanism to supplement a high-level inter-agency implementation one is,
moreover, emerging as an international best practice in many fields of international law.2 35 Such a body would, for example, be empowered to oversee
235. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 33,
openedfor signatureMar. 30, 2007, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Dec.
6, 2006) (calling upon States Parties to create an implementation focal point within
government, preferably within an inter-agency coordination mechanism, as well as an
independent monitoring mechanism).
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and independently report on follow-up initiatives, both by government and
broader civil society groups. The mechanism would likewise include spaces
for broad stakeholder participation, ensuring that multiple spaces of leverage and information collection are available to local actors involved in implementation and follow-up work. It might also include the function of
expressly coordinating follow-up activities, publicizing best practices, linking local groups with others working on similar issues or strategies, and
more generally orchestrating the partnerships and initiatives being pursued
by a great variety of social stakeholders. It can thereby serve both as a
check on fluctuations in political will to implement needed reforms and as a
resource for civil society advocates in their own implementation efforts.
The permanent research foundation contemplated in the TRCK's Framework Act could very profitably play this important orchestration role.
C.

Truth as an Ongoing Project

A third lesson arising from the contributions relates to the importance
of pursuing truth as an ongoing project-one that can speak to multiple
constituencies and unfold dialogically over time. Indeed, a major criticism
of the TRCK, and truth commissions more generally, is that a highly limited version of the truth may be produced that serves some larger macropolitical end, rather than the needs of victims and society at large in understanding the ideological or structural basis of violence. In the Korean context, this has manifested in the TRCK's preference for forensically
investigating and verifying "micro-truths," rather than situating those events
within a broader narrative that could help the nation understand the ideological and structural causes of past violence, including the complex ways they
continue to manifest in the present. Such linkages are essential if policy
connections are in fact going to be made between truth commission findings
on the past and recommendations for present action. The mobilization of
public action, too, depends in large measure on the clarity of these linkages,
a fact Hun Joon Kim underscores in highlighting the higher rate of public
awareness and superior implementation record produced in response to the
truth-telling work of the Jeju Commission, as compared to the TRCK.
While some prominent experts thus stress the importance of finality in
truth commission life-spans, 36 the reality, complexities, and limitations of
truth in South Korea, and many other contexts, suggest that the truth-telling
exercise should be extended on a more permanent basis. 237 Jeon Seung-Hee,
236. HAYNER, supra note 6, at 215-16 (suggesting that truth commissions should
ideally have a maximum life-span of two to three years).
237. The two positions may not be inconsistent, provided the short- and long-term
bodies are institutionally distinct.
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for example, has argued that the mission of a truth commission can be
achieved only when it exists as a permanent institution. Such an institution,
she stresses, must be one in which "individuals and social groups and entities are provided with an appropriate level of authority and resources and
can then creatively collaborate with each other. '238 Jeon stresses in this regard the importance of pursuing truth as part of an ongoing process that is
both dynamic and dialogic. This is particularly important in the Korean
context, she posits, given how selectively truth has been remembered. She
thus issues a plea to engage in creative and critical dialogues with various
discourses of the Korean War, which, she suggests, can only be done by
creating "space for endless dialogues," particularly through multimedia and
239
interactive structures.
She uses the example of the multimedia project "Still Present Pasts" as
a key example of how a continuous truth seeking process may be pursued in
Korea. Although focused on Korean-American memories of the War, that
project offers an important example of how memories can be kept alive
through interactive narrative displays, and how younger generations can
come to understand the painful memories and long-silenced experiences
that their elders lived through. These understandings are critical for ensuring that clear inter-generational connections are made between the findings
and conclusions of truth-telling initiatives and the adequacy of present reform measures taken (or not) in response. Such understandings are likewise
essential if the long-desired goal of Korean reunification is ever to be
achieved. Similar sorts of projects are being pursued in the form of community museums and "houses of memory" in Guatemala 240 and sites of conscience in other places of transition. 241 If appropriately resourced and
staffed, the permanent research institute contemplated by the Framework
Act can additionally serve to house or promote localized initiatives directed
toward these ends.
D.

Data Accessibility and Independence

Fourth, for society to act, it must know; it must have access to information. As virtually all contributors to this Special Issue have observed, the
238. Jeon, supra note 40, at 623.
239. Id.
240. See Arriaza & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 105, at 158-59.
241. Sites of conscience refer to "public memorials that make a specific commitment to democratic engagement through programs that stimulate dialogue on pressing
social issues today and that provide opportunities for public involvement in those issues."
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availability and accessibility of data regarding the past, and of access to
government policies looking to the future, is of critical importance to the
transitional justice project in South Korea. This is true to ensure both broad
social awareness of the TRCK and the past it investigated, and that the
project of investigation and analysis can continue well into the future. It is

essential, therefore, that priority attention be given to implementing the
TRCK's interim recommendation regarding the creation of a permanent
data archive. The establishment of such data archives and the legislation of
general freedom of information laws have indeed been recognized as a critical component for implementing the right to truth for victims of human
242
rights violations.
Kim Dong-Choon stresses in particular the imperative in the Korean
context of guaranteeing the accessibility, safety, and independence of such
an archive. He correspondingly urges its creation in an institution independent of the National Archives of South Korea, a recommendation that no
doubt results from his difficult experience in seeking documents related to
abuses of the past from the Korean National Police and Ministry of Defense. 243 Such a suggestion deserves careful attention. Indeed, other societies have sought similar nongovernmental or otherwise independent homes
for physical and online data archives to ensure their permanent accessibility
to the public, and to facilitate scholarly and legal research into historical
documentation of past abuses. They have done so either in the absence of
government interest in maintaining public data archives or in coordination
with government authorities, often as a safeguard against future censorship
or destruction of data sources that implicate distinct national authorities.
In Cambodia, for example, the Documentation Center of Cambodia, an
independent non-governmental research institute, partnered with the national government to establish an extensive archive of data on Khmer
Rouge history available to researchers.2 44 The archive now maintains the
world's most extensive data on Khmer Rouge history and has become a
primary source for continuing investigations into the past, both for ordinary
Cambodians and national and international researchers.
In Burma, by contrast, human rights organizations worked independently of government to create a publicly accessible data archive. Formed
242. See, e.g., Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of

Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity, UN Commission for Human
Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/ADD.1, Feb. 8, 2005; Right to the Truth, Human

Rights Council Resolution 9/11, UN Doc. A/HRC/Res/9/I 1 (2008).
243. See Kim Dong-Choon, supra note 65, at 107-08 (describing difficulties).
244. See Ciorciari & Ramji-Nogales, supra note 101, at 213-14. The archive
originated in the Cambodian Genocide Project at Yale University.
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in 2004, the Network for Human Rights Documentation (ND-Burma), a coalition of twelve member organizations trained in human rights documentation, assembled a common open-source database of over 3,000 records of
human rights violations. By doing so, coalition members "seek to collectively use the truth of what communities in Burma have endured to challenge the regime's power through present-day advocacy as well as prepare
for justice and accountability measures in a potential transition. '245
An innovative third approach has been pursued in Guatemala. When
millions of administrative police documents dating from 1882 to 1996 were
discovered in Guatemala City in 2005, a creative partnership was formed
between the Historical Archive of the National Police of Guatemala and a
private U.S. university to produce an online digital archive of the documents, thereby ensuring their safe preservation and long-term accessibility
to researchers. 246 Although the physical archive remains preserved in Guatemala as an important historical patrimony of the Guatemalan people, 247
the housing of the online data archive (which mirrors and extends it) in an
independent body outside of Guatemala was seen as necessary given continuing issues of state-sponsored impunity and cover-up for the massive
state abuses during the country's nearly four decades of armed civil conflict. Indeed, the Guatemalan government and police had long denied the
existence of the documents, including when such records were requested by
the state-authorized U.N. Commission for Historical Clarification and a second truth commissions sponsored by the Catholic Church in the 1990s. 2 48
The archive has since become a focal point for a renewed debate about
Guatemala's recent past, serving as a valuable resource for human rights
activists, victims, historians, and other researchers. 249
245. ND-Burma, About Us, availableat <http://www.nd-burma.org/> (formed in
2004 to provide a way for Burma human rights organizations to collaborate on the
human rights documentation process, "ND-Burma conducts fieldwork trainings; coordinates members' input into a common database using Martus, an open-source software
developed by Benetech; and engages in joint-advocacy campaigns.").
246. The Archive is currently comprised of approximately 80 million documents.
As of early 2012, about 12 million of the documents had been digitized, with 10 million
already uploaded to the online data archive housed at the University of Texas at Austin.
More documents are being digitized every year and added to the digital collection. See
University of Texas at Austin, Politics of Memory: Guatemala's National Police

Archive, <http://www.utexas.edu/law/conferences/guatemala/>.
247. AHPN, Digital Archive of the Guatemalan National Police Historical
Archive, Home, <https://ahpn.lib.utexas.edu/>.
248. Politics of Memory, supra note 246.
249. Id.
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South Korean stakeholders should look closely at these various models
and experiences, determining what kinds of arrangements would work most
effectively and securely in their own domestic context to ensure the longterm safety, accessibility, and independence of its historical human rights
archives. Such accessibility is indispensable for making sure the lessons and
linkages of the past are always available for understanding and engaging
with the present. As noted, the experience of the Jeju Commission in South
Korea bears this out, both in terms of longer-term scholarly and citizen
interest and actual implementation of the truth commission's policy
recommendations.
E.

Measurable Indicators

Finally, although not raised expressly by any of the contributors, a
strong case can be made for the importance of creating measurable indicators, both quantitative and qualitative, to assess the degree of implementation of truth commission recommendations. Such indicators can serve a
variety of purposes. Perhaps most importantly, they can be used as a tool by
a range of civil society actors for holding distinct stakeholders to account
for taking meaningful actions with respect to discrete recommendations.
They can thereby help to ensure that truth commission follow-up work remains prominent on the national political agenda at a truth commission's
expiry. The use and active monitoring of indicators may also serve to facilitate key learning processes related to implementation, illuminating not only
acts of footdragging and backtracking by distinct constituencies, but also
best practices that might be replicated or adapted by new communities.
Implementation-related indicators might also be used by international
actors to leverage and further incentivize progress; for example, by linking
international aid or other diplomatic benefits to indicator-related
benchmarks. Truth commission observers have indeed long noted the utility
of tying commission recommendations to international aid.2 5 0 Examples
where this has occurred nonetheless suggest that dangers arise where local
actors do not have independent ownership of truth commission outputs and
25 1
international pressure is correspondingly interpreted as foreign meddling.
The case of El Salvador is particularly instructive in this regard. 252 The creation of appropriate indicators and benchmarks by national civil society itself may help to avoid these perils by ensuring that international
250. See supra note 226.
251. See ERIC WIEBELHAUS-BRAHM,

TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND TRANSITIONAL SO-

CIETIES: THE IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY

252. Id.

151-52 (2010).
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conditionality is focused on areas of local priority, and that it in fact accentuates democratic ownership of institutional transformation.

The process of ensuring effective implementation of the TRCK's recommendations and related reforms in South Korea will be a long and difficult one. If it is to be successful, and if it is to result in deep preventative
reform throughout society, the active participation of all social stakeholders
will be necessary. We hope this Special Issue can serve to promote more
rigorous debate and strategic action on the TRCK's recommendations, including, in particular, their creative use as a springboard for initiating far
deeper and richer processes of truth-telling, social repair, community-building, memorialization, human rights education, social reconstruction, and institutional reform.

